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Introduction
The Panama Canal is one of the major commercial
waterways of the world and, furthermore, it is vital
to the defence of the United States. ·Before this
canal could be constructed, it was necessary to per
suade the British government to give up its right to
share with the United States the building of an
isthmian canal.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850

had provided that neither the United States nor Great
Britain would carry out the project singly.

Later

through the Hay-Pauncefote treaty Great Britain
agreed to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and
allowed the United States alone to build and fortify
the canal.

This was an obvious success for American

diplomacy.
Most accounts of the origins of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty have been written in a. manner that leaves the
impression that the United States was duped into the
involvement and that, once involved, was unable to
maintain a relationship with Great Britain and Central
America that was in line with American policy and
public opinion.

,

This paper cites evidence which leads

to the conclusion that Secretary of State John M.
Clayton actually achieved a distinct diplomatic victory
iii

in securing the treaty.

The victory lay in the effective

alteration of the traditional British policy of contain
ment of the United States as a result of the decisions
made by the British government in negotiating and
signing the Clayton-Bulwer treaty;
Much of the British diplomatic correspondence re
lating to the treaty was inaccessible to the author.
However, all channels of American diplomatic corre
spondence for the negotiation period w.ere explored and

..,...

-....

,

secondary sources on the British side, as well as con
siderable primary material was used.

Extensive use was

made of the John M. Clayton Papers at the Library of
Congress and the National Archives collection of
official State Department correspondence.
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty affected Anglo-American
isthmian diplomacy for half a century.

It is doubtful,

however, that it was the major factor in preventing
the construction of a canal during this period.

When

the United States was sufficiently strong to challenge
the British in the isthmus, the latter accepted the
United States as a potential partner in any possible
canal.

When the United States was prepared to proceed

alone, the British once more recognized the new nation's
ambitions and pride.

Much credit must go to the British

for the sort of realism that avoided conflict and paved
iv

the way for eventual cordial ties with their American
cousins.

V
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I.

BRITISH AND SPANISH RIVALRY IN
CENTRAL AMERICA UP TO 1814
Spanish Discovery

Spanish claims to sovereignty over. the Atlantic
coast of Central America were based on discoveries
made as early as 1502 •.

After touching the shore at

Cape Honduras in that year Christopher Columbus
followed the coast of Central America south to Panama.
A few years later (between 1506 and 1508) two more
Spanish explorers, Pinzbn and Solis, landed at Cape
Honduras.1 This expedition, however, followed the
coastline north along the shores of present day

.....·r--..

British Honduras to Yucatan.

The Hernandez de Cordoba

·expedition of 1517 to Yucatan eventually led to the
Cortez expeditions of 1518 and 1519 which resulted in

the conquest of Mexico.

The year 1527 saw the Spanish conquest of the
Yucatan peninsula and the establishment of a provincial
governor, Francisco de Montejo.

The following year

Governor Montejo set out on an exploratory expedition
to the south along the coast of the present site of
British Honduras.

The governor sailed from Yucatan

1n.A.G. Waddell, British Honduras (London:
University Press, 1961), 3.
1

Oxford

2

down the length of the Central American coast until he
reached Golfo Dulce, where he turned back to Yucatan.
Shortly afterward Governor Montejo sent a subordinate,
Lieutenent Davila, on a similar mission, but also to
establish a settlement at Chetumal.

Lieutenent Davila

found the.Indians too determined for his small force
to overcome and was forced,to abandon Chetumal after
only a short occupation.

He and his party found it

necessary to escape in canoes and flee down the coast
of Central America.

The reports of Lieutenent Davila's

expedition merely confirmed the suspicions of Governor
Montejo that the region was unsuitable for colonization.
In 1535 Governor Montejo was also made governor
of the province of Honduras, which extended his domain
to include the Gulf of Honduras and the Golfo Dulce
region.

However, in 1544 Montejo was relieved of his

governorship.

The splitting of the two provinces left

the Golfo Dulce area still a part of the Yucatan
province but with a rather slender line of communications
between itself and Chetumal (which was resettled in
1546).

The loss of this territory (Honduras) caused

the line of communications between Chetumal and Golfo
Dulce to be neglected.

The unsuitability for settle

ment of the coast between the two points was the major
reason for rapid neglect of the coastal region.

3
In 1549 the Golfo Dulce area was withdrawn from
the province of Yucatan, eliminating any reason for
maintaining ties with the coastal area north to
Chetumal.

Henceforward the Spanish failed to construct

settlements or maintain physical control over the north
eastern Atlantic coast of Central America, basing their
rights of sovereignty upon the discovery and exploration
of the area.

The location of the area in relation to

Spanish centers of activity and the hostility of the
natives were the area's greatest disadvantages.
The Spanish hegemony in the Caribbean area was
successfully challenged by the British in 1655 when
Cromwell took Jamaica.

After defeating the Dutch

fleets in Europeans waters the British fleet was used
by Cromwell in the Caribbean rather than allow the
well equipped and efficient fleet to lay idle.2
Privateering was the primary occupation of the English
men who were seeking fortunes in the Caribbean at the
Spaniard's expense.

Freebooting was a lucrative field

for the English captains as long as Spanish treasure
ships transported their bullion to Spain.

After the

pirates looted the Spanish treasure ships they usually
burned or abandoned them.

However, some of the pirates

2w.E. Lunt, History of England (New York:
Brothers, 1956), 450.

Harper

4

soon learned that the logwood cargo from Central
American forests they had been burning after stripping
the ship of its riches, was also quite. valuable.

As

the Spanish ships became scarcer the pirates found it
,.

·r.,,

,

relatively easy to found a small settlement at Belize
and cut their own logwood.
With the suppression of privateering and piracy
by the British as well as the Spanish many of the
adventurers turned to the logwood industry at Belize.
The logwood settlement prospered so rapidly that by 1670
the British government attempted to negotiate with
Spain for the recognition of the rights of British
subjects in the area.

In a treaty of that year,

article seven read:
It is agreed that the most serene King
of Great Britain, his heirs and successors,
shall have, hold, keep and enjoy forever
with plenary right of sovereignty, dominion,
possession and propriety, all those lands,
regions, islands, colonies, and places, what
soever, being or situated in the West Indies,
or any part of America, which the said King
of Great Britain or his subjects do at present
hold or possess. 3
The treaty was negotiated for the purpose of settling
the disputed claim of the British to Jamaica.

The

3Lewis Hertslett, A Complete Collection of the
Treaties and Conventions and Reciprocal Regulations at
Present Subsistin Between Great Britain and Forei
Powers London: Henry Butterworth, 1840 , Vol. II,
196-197. See Appendix, page 122.

5
British, however, also attempted to utilize the same
clause in their claim to the Belize settlement.

The

Spanish ignored the British claims and continued to
harass the Hritish settlement.
From 1670 until 1763 British subjects in Belize
were able to retain control of the area (with the
exception of a short period in the 1730's when Spanish
drove them out).

Although the Spanish denied the

legality of the settlements and Britain officially
demurred in favor of the Spanish, the settlers main
tained their positions and industries.
The conclusion of the Seven Years' War in 1763
and the subsequent peace treaties (Peace of Paris)
resulted in the reestablishment of Spanish sovereignty
in Central America.

In the treaty, Great Britain agreed

to recognize Spanish sovereignty and the Spanish granted
concessions to the settlers in the area.

Spain allowed

the settlers to remain in the area on a temporary basis.
The "Baymen" (British subjects on the Central American
coast) were to demolish all fortifications in exchange
for the privilege of cutting the local woods and
Spanish protection.

The agreement between Great

Britain and Spain did not settle the problem, however,
because of the rather lenient interpretation by the
Baymen of the treaty stipulations.

Although the

6

Spanish succeeded in obtaining the desired concession
from the British government, the real problem at the
moment was to force the Baymen to go along with the
British agreement.
In 1779, with the American Revolution in progress,
Spain declared war on Great Britain and utilized the
opportunity to attempt to drive the Baymen from Belize.
The Spanish forces surprised the Baymen and captured
the settlement before the news of the hostilities
re�ched the British settlements.

Spain managed to

retain control of the coastal settlements throughout
the war.

The peace negotiations led to the Treaty of

Versailles in 1783 which spelled out the Spanish and
British positions in Central America much more clearly
than any other agreement in the past.

Spain retained

her sovereignty over the Belize coastal area and
granted some closely defined concessions to the Baymen.
Their wood cutting industry was to be confined to an
area between the Hondo and Belize rivers.4 The provisions of the treaty were too restrictive for the
Baymen, however.

They continued to violate Spanish

sovereignty and law by extending their domain beyond
the depicted boundaries of th� treaty.

The Baymen had

411State Papers", The Annual Register,1783, 334-335•
See Appendix, page 130 and map on page 131.
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found the area allocated to them already cut over (by

themselves) and lacking mahogany.

Mahogany was a

commodity which had only recently been developed as a
valuable product of Central America.
After three years of discussion and controversey,
the two nations negotiated a "Convention Between Great
Britain and Spain" which was dated July 14, 1786.5
The new treaty reaffirmed Spanish sovereignty over the
territory but granted larger concessions to the Baymen.
Their territory was extended south to the Sibun river,
an area upon which the Baymen had been encroaching for
years according to the Spanish.

The new treaty also

granted the Baymen the right to mahogany and most other
products they had not been allowed before.

The Spanish

demanded, however, that the Baymen construct no forti
fications, no permanent plantations, nor any formal
governmental bodies.

In short, the Spanish would

tolerate a settlement of only a temporary nature.
Spain retained the right of inspection twice a year in
order to safeguard her sovereignty over the area.

Although the Spanish attempted to regulate and
control the settlement, several factors worked in
opposition to a peaceful co-existence.

The first

510c. cit., p. 1786, 263. See Appendix, page 139
and map on page 131.
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factor was the influx to Belize from the Mosquito Shore
of settlers who were displaced by the stipulations of
the treaty of 1786.

These new immigrants also increased

the competition in the Belize lumber industry.

The

attempts of the Baymen to increase their dominions and
to establish permanent plantations brought harsh
reprisals from the Spanish.

Another factor was the

jealousy of the Spaniards in the wood cutting industry.
They were as vigilant for British encroachments as the
inspectors were.
The Baymen became distressed at their vulnerability
and the many Spanish threats.

They were constantly

appealing to Britain for the appointment of a Superin
tendent to help them in their relations with the
British government in London.

A Colonel Despard

arrived·tn 1786 to serve the Baymen as their first
Superintendent.

Colonel Despard did not quite meet

with the approval of the Baymen because he felt the
settlers ought to live up to their treaty obligations.
He constantly co-operated with the Spanish inspecting
officers, which didn't exactly endear him in the
hearts of the settlers.

Col9nel Despard was replaced

when he tried to substitute his direct administration
for the traditional public meeting of the settlement.
Colonel Hunter, Despard's replacement,' restored the
.......,....

old system of governing to the settlements and also
,

9
prepared the settlers for the possibility of war with
Spain.

After he completed his mission and the war

threat failed to materialize Colonel Hunter was recalled·

to London.

From 1791 until 1797 Belize had no superintendent.

The possibility of renewed hostilities with Spain saw

the appointment of a Colonel Barrow as Superintendent.

Colonel Barrow's major task was to prepare the defenses

of the settlement for the probable Spanish attack.

When war finally came, he was able to lead the settlers

to victory over the Spanish in their last attempt to
take Belize by force.

Although the British settlers in the area usually

managed to maintain a military superiority over the

Spanish, the British government always acquiesced in

favor of the Spanish at the negotiating table.

The

third article of the Peace of Amiens in 1802 read:
His Britannic Majesty restores to the
French republic and its allies, viz. his
Catholic majesty and the Batavian republic,
all the possessions and colonies which
respectively belonged to them, and which
have been either occupied or conquered by
the British orces during the course of the
present war. 6

Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 caused an

alliance in 1809 between Spain and Great Britain.
6williams, 8.

The

10
alliance brought an end to four years of hostilities
between the two countries in order to meet the French
challenge.

In actuality the alliance was an end to

hostilities and a temporary deferrment of disputes
until 1814.

The 1814 treaty proved to-be a crushing

blow to the Baymen because it reaffirmed the provisions
of the treaty of 1786 concerning Spanish sovereignty
over the Central American territory.
The Bay Islands
In 1502, during his fourth exploratory voyage,
Christopher Columbus landed on, and claimed for Spain,
a group of islands in the southeastern part of the
Gulf of Honduras.

These islands later became known as

the Bay Islands and, although largely uninhabitated,
they were c·onsidered a Spanish possession until 1642.
In that year a force of buccaneers landed on the
largest of the islands, Ruatan, and established a
base of·eperations for their depradatory activities.
The Spanish drove the British freebooters off the
island in 1650.

The British did not return until

1742, when war was renewed between Britain and Spain.
As usual, however, the British relinquished their
position to the Spanish in the peace treaty following
the war.

The treaty of Aix-�a-Chapelle recognized

11
Spanish sovereignty in Central America, as did most of
the previous treaties.

The British position in Ruatan

remained rather tenuous until the early nineteenth
century.

Until that time British settlers were officially

excluded from the Bay Islands by the same agreements
previously mentioned concerning Beliz�:

the treaty

of Versailles, the supplemental treaty of 1786, the
alliance of 1809, and the treaty of 1814, all of which
reaffirmed Spanish sovereignty over the area.
The Mosquito Shore
It has been mentioned earlier that Columbus
journeyed south from the Cape of Honduras and laid
claim to the land as he travelled.

On his southern

route Columbus sailed along the coasts of present day
Honduras and Nicaragua, which he claimed as Spanish
territory by right of discovery.

Due to the inhos

pitality of the terrain and the Indians, lack of
natural wealth for exploitation, and distance from
Spanish centers of activity the "Mosquito Shore'' (so
named for the Indians residing there) was sparsely
inhabitated.

In spite of these facts Spain still

maintained her claims to sovereignty over the length
of the Central American coast.
The Indian inhabitants of the shore were a rather

12
fierce group known as the Mosquitos or the Moscos.
They were made up of three racial strains; Caucasian,
Negro, and American aborigine.

Early Spanish efforts

to colonize the area included unsuccessful attempts to
subjugate the Mosquitos.

The Mosquitos retained the

memory of harsh treatment at the hands of the Spanish
and henceforward maintained a decidedly hostile attitude
toward them.

The lack of wealth in the coastal area

and the enmity of the Indians forced the Spanish to
seek their fortunes further inland.
The British managed to establish rapport with the
Mosquitos when the Spanish failed.

British privateers

found the Mosquitos a natural ally and cultivated a
lasting friendship with the Indians.

After the capture

of Jamaica in 1655 Oldman, the Mosquito chief, was taken
to England where an alliance of rather dubious validity
was negotiated.

From that time on the Mosquito Indians
described themselves as subjects of the British throne.7
The British authorities on Jamaica immediately
began to utilize their new-found allies, the Mosquitos,
in the recovery of runaway slaves seeking refuge in the
7At first appearances that gesture on the part of
the British governmentr appeared to be nothing more than
the flattering of a petty chieftain, but the consequences
and the precedent setting of the act would later be of
a great.�dvantage to the British government.
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coastal regions.

The British also introduced the use

of firearms to the Mosquitos and supplied them with
weapons to be used against their mutual enemy, the
Spanish.

It was only a matter of a few years until

the British on Jamaica began to establi-sh small
settlements on the Central American mainland.

These

settlers soon began to clamor for their rights as
Englishmen whenever they encountered difficulties with
the Spanish and they began to prod the Mosquitos to
ask for the British protection guaranteed them under
the alliance negotiated by Oldman.

The British governor

of Jamaica didn't seem to accept their argument as a
sound premise for British protection, but did send
Justices of the Peace to the coast in order to maintain
order and regulate the commercial affairs of the settle
ments.
British involvement in the affairs of the Mosquito

Shore was increased in 1739 when war between Spain and
Britain was renewed.

Governor Trelawney of Jamaica

sent Captain Robert Hodgson to the Mosquito Shore in

order to negotiate a new alliance with the Indians.8
The ultimate purpose of the alliance was to secure
cooperation in fomenting a general revolt along the
8williams, 17.
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coast against the Spanish which would enable the British
to obtain possession of the area.

Captain Hodgson not

only secured an alliance with the Indians but also a
cession of their lands to Britain.9 Hodgson and his
Mosquito allies failed to precipitate any sort of a gen
eral revolt in Central America, but he did strengthen the
overall British position on the Mosquito Shore by obtain
ing the land cession from the Mosquitos and defeating a
Spanish expedition in 1747.

As a reqard for his success

ful intrigues against the Spanish and his generation of
a greater determination among the British settlers on
the Mosquito Shore he was made Superintendent.
Althou·gh the terms of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
in 1750 called for evacuation of the territory by the
British, Superintendent Hodgson stood his ground in the
face or·spanish threats.

He maintained that it was necessary

to remain on the coast in order to prevent hostilities be
tween the British settlers and the Spanish authorities.
The Spanish didn't accept Superintendent Hodgson's reasoning and began to make preparations for dislodging him.
Governor Knowles of Jamaica cautioned the home government
about Hodgson's impetuosity on the Mosquito question.

The

government in London counseled Hodgson to move more cautiously.

.....· �

9rra D. Travis, The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (Michigan
Political Science Association, 1899), 28 •
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The retirement of Governor Knowles and the outbreak

of the Seven Years' War in 1756 introduced a new oppor
tunity for aggrandizement in Central America.

During

the new conflict there were no major territorial gains
made by the British, but they were able to maintain
their position throughout the war.

The Peace of Paris

of 1763 provided that Britain should destroy "all

fortifications which her subjects had erected in the
vicinity of Honduras Bay and other places in the
territory of Spain in that part of the world 11 • 10

The

Spanish had apparently intended that the abovementioned
section include all of Spanish America, but Great
Britain later announced some reservations in inter
preting that portion of the treaty.

Britain granted

that the Black River settlement was to be regarded
within the Bay of Honduras region (hence it should
be abandoned), but not the territory extending to the
south of that region; i.e. the settlements at Blue
fields, Cape Gracias a Dios, and San Juan.

The son of

Robert Hodgson, Captain Robert Hodgson, was appointed
as the Superintendent of the area and served from

1767 until 1775.

During that period Captain Hodgson

established an elective commission which served a
semi-legislative capacity in the governing of the
10Hertslett, Vol. II, 235. See Appendix, page 128.
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Mosquito:Coast.
The Spanish officials continued to register com
plaints with Great Britain against the settlements,
but they were largely ignored.

At that time Britain

began.to espouse a policy which would greatly effect
its position while negotiating with the United States
in 1850; the maintenance of a protectorate over the
Mosquito Kingdom.

Until this period Britain had merely

claimed difficulty in controlling it's subjects and
their actions in Central America.

During Captain

Roger Hodgson's tenure as Superintendent the British
deemed it expedient to uphold its obligations under
the various treaties of alliance with the Mosquitos.
These treaties recognized the Mosquito Kingdom as
sovereign and independent.

The British also relied

on their activities on the Mosquito Shore.

As it has

been early mentioned, the Mosquito Indians considered
themselves under the protective wing of Great Britain.
It would seem that the British were attempting to make
good their claims to the coastal regions, or the long
cherished dream of obtainin� the interior regions to
Lake N.icaragua. 11
11Although several writers hold that Great Britain
coveted the interior regions of Nicaragua and Honduras,
no precise reason for the covetousness is given. The
British may have been motivated by the desire to obtain
greater areas of forest in order to exploit the logwood

17
The Spanish registered protests with the government

in London, but all to no avail until 1779.

British

violation of Spanish sovereignty in Central America
certainly weighed heavily in Spain's decision to de
clare war on Britain during the American Revolution in

1779.

The war w as an excuse for Spain to attempt to

forcibly dislodge the British enemy from her Central
American possessions.

Spain immediately took possession

of Belize and managed to r etain control of it for the
remainder of the war.

Britain, however, managed to

secure a foothold on the Mosquito Shore after some
early Spanish victories.12

In the peace negotiations at Versailles in 1783

the British were again forced to recognize Spanish
sovereignty in Central America.

At first the British

negotiators and ministry balked at accepting an article
which restored to Spain all possessions to be found
on the "Spanish Continent".

However, Charles James

Fox, the Cabinet head, pointed out to the cabinet and
King George III that the British did not have to accept
the Spanish interpretation of the "Spanish Continent".
industry and obtain timbers and masts for their ships.
It is possible that some persons in the British hierarchy
were farsighted enough to realize the potential value
of the right of transit across the isthmus, but it seems
doubtful that the Central American policy of Great Britain
in 1779 rested soley upon isthmian transit rights.
12Travis,� 26-27.

18
At Fox's behest the British government allowed the
article to stand.13
After signing the treaty of Versailles in 1783

the Spanish attempted to get the British to evacuate
the settlements on the Mosquito Shore.

The British

replied that the Spanish had never conquered the
Mosquito Indians and could not claim the coast to be
part of a "Spanish Continent".

The British referred

to the coast a� part of "the American Continent''•

It

is needless to say that the Spanish were furious over
that turn of events.

The Spanish persisted in their

demands and finally Britain assented to negotiate a .
supplem·ental treaty, which was signed in 1786 and which
clarified the Central American situation.

The new

treaty emphatically guaranteed Spain's sovereignty
over the Mosquito Shore.
His Britannic Majesty's subjects, and
the other colonists who have hithereto en
joyed the protection of England, shall
evacuate the country of the Mosquitos, as
well as the continent in general, and the
islands adjacent, without exception, situated beyond the line hereinafter described.14
The treaty of 1786 was unpopular in Britain as
well as with the settlers on the Mosquito Shore.
�,�

The

13Travis,. 28.
1411state Papers" The Annual Register, 1786, 263.
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majority of the settlers, however, adhered to the
stipulations of the treaty and evacuated the territory
Although the Spanish had secured

under discussion.

their title to the Mosquito Shore they could not main
tain possession of it.

The few settlers that remained

collaborated with the Mosquitos to defeat the Spanish
By 1796 the Mosquitos had driven the

recovery program.

last of the Spanish from their territory.

Spain con

tinued to voice its claim to the Mosquito Shore even
though it was not able to mount another military expedi
tion to recover it.
Although she frequently held portions of Central
America Great Britain never possessed a clear title to
any of the land.

The strongest claims for Britain lay

in Belize (British Honduras) by right of settlement,
development, and agreement.

Even though Spain had

earlier discovered Belize, British settlers moved into
the area and settled there after several unsuccessful
Spanish attempts to do so.

The settlers suffered the

hardships of the primitive environment but managed to
develop a viable economy based upon the products of
the forest.

Finally, by agreement the British secured

the right from the original possessor, Spain, to carry
on their enterprises in Belize.
Britain's position in relation to Central America

20
was stabilized near the turn of the century (1800) due
to her recognition of Spanish sovereignty in the treaty
of 1796 and the reaffirmation of this recognition in
the treaties of 1802, 1808, and 1814.

At the same

time, British energy and ingenuity was ·being heavily
taxed on the European continent by the French Revolution
and the Napoleonic wars.
After the defeat of Napoleon two factors motivated
the British to renew their activities in Central
America; the Latin American independence movement and
the expansion of the United States.

These two factors

and their effects up·on the nature and the result of
the British complicity in Central American affairs
are important to an understanding of subsequent
developments.

II.

THE SCOPE Ol!, THE CONFLICT ENLARGES

Great Britain and the 0entral American
Independence Movement
The Anglo-Spanish alliance of 1809 called for a
later treaty to settle any outstanding disputes between
the two governments.1 In 1814 such a treaty was nego
tiated.

One of the disputes settled was the question

of sovereignty over the Mosquito Shore, the Belize
settlement, and the Hay Islands.

Unhappily for the

Baymen, the British government reaffirmed its position
as stated in the treaty of Paris (1783) and the supple
mentary treaty of 1786, guaranteeing Spanish sovereignty.
During the Napoleonic Wars Spain lost effective
control over her Latin American colonies.

Great Britain

became.the guarantor of the Spanish colonies for the
war years in opposition to her prior role in Latin
America.2 In order to preserve the strength of her
Spanish ally Britain withdrew support from insurgent
movements throuf)lout the Spanish colonies and encouraged
those enga�eo in such movements a policy of reconciliation
1see appendix, page 148.
2William w. Kaufmann, British Policy and the
Inde endence of Latin America, 1804-1828 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1951 , 42.
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with the mother country.

The �ritish government also

encouraged the Spanish to open to British merchants.
colonial ports which previously had been closed to
protect the Spanish commercial monopoly.
Although the British claimed to be trying to save
the Spanish empire, two factors worked against this
preservation.

The first factor was that Britain

staunchly opposed any transfer of Spain's troops from
Europe to her American colonies in order to pacify
insurgent forces.

Britain maintained that they were

needed to oppose Napoleon in Europe.

Although the

Spanish troops were probably needed on the European
continent, the fact remains that without such troops
in Latin America the insurgents had a much freer hand
in their activities.

The second factor working against

Spain's retention of her colonies was that the coffers
of the various colonies grew at a rapid pace due to the
increased earnings of import duties.

These duties

were increased by the growth in imports of British
goods during the war with France.

The monies raised

were later used in the revolutionary struggles against
Spain which followed that war.
On September 21, 1821 the Declaration of Independence
of the United Provinces of Central America was announced •.
Almost simultaneously the government of this budding
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nation also announced its claims by right of inheritance
to the areas then held by the British settlers.

Al

though the British settlers in Central America clamored
for formal British recognition of their status as
British colonists, the British government did not
immediately renew its claims to the areas.

The British

colonial secretary reacted to the settler's demands by
asking the Crown's legal advisers the status of Belize
(an area to which Britain seemingly had the strongest
claim).

On the basis of the treaties in 1783, 1786,

1802, 1809, and 1814 the legal advisers asserted that
Spain still retained sovereignty over the area.3 At
that time the British government briefly considered
negotiating with Spain for the rights to the Belize
territory; however, that plan was not immediately put
into effect.

The British foreign minister, Lord

Palmerston, refused to negotiate with the Central
Americans because he had no intention of recognizing
their claim to the former Spanish titles even implicitly.
The Monroe Doctrine
Before immediately delving into the British schemes
and negotiations it is necessary to introduce a second
factor aside from Central American independence which
3williams, 32,
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greatly affected the complexion of the Central American
scene.

Emerging from the War of 1812, the United States

began to feel it's importance in the Western Hemisphere.
The desire for territorial expansion and the development
of national self-awareness began to emerge as part of
the national image.

The continuous e�tension of the

American frontiers westward seemed to "prove" to
Americans that the United States was destined for
greatness and was fit to watch over the continents of
North and South America.
As champions of democracy and freedom, the American

leaders looked benignly upon the revolutionaries of the
Latin American colonies of Spain.

The United States

government recognized it would be unwise to take an open
part in the revolution or recognize the new countries
until Spain finally exchanged ratifications of the
Adams-Onis treaty in 1820.4 The United States also
remained a trifle hesitant about recognizing the
countries because President Monroe wasn't certain

about the attitudes of the powers of the Grand Alliance.5
4

Spain would not ratify the treaty immediately
because she feared the United States would recognize her
rebelling colonies, thereby facilitating their attempts
for international acceptance. However, Andrew Jackson
requested permission from President Monroe to enforce
the treaty "at the mouth of a cannon" which the President
did not oppose too strongly. That suggestion prompted
the Spanish to action.
5Kaufmann, 147,
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(The Grand Alliance was an agreement between Russia,
Austria, France and Prussia to restore monarchies,
particularly Spain, to their former positions prior
to the French Revolution.

In Spain's case that meant

the restoration of her colonies.)

However, in 1822

President Monroe finally did recogniz� several Latin
American governments, a move which placed the United
States squarely in the path of the Grand Alliance's
plans for Spanish restoration.
British Foreign Minister.George Canning also opposed
the Grand Alliance's plans for Latin America, but not
for such altruistic reasons as did the United States.
Canning wished to maintain the position of the British
merchants who had displaced the Spanish trade monopolies
upon the success of the revolutions.

He announced his

opposition to the intervention of the Grand Alliance
in Spain, but to no avail.

An August 16, 1823 Canning

broached the subject of the possibility of a joint·
proclamation by the United States and Great Britain in
opposition to the announced plans of the Grand Alliance.
Richard Rush, the American Minister to London, recog
nized that Canning was attempting to achieve two ends
with one tactic.

If the United States and Great Britain

joined in making such a proclamation, Great Britain
would surely defeat the ambitions of the European
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powers, an action and this would re-establish Britain
in the European balance of power.

In 1823 Great

Britain had recognized none of the new Latin American
countries but hoped to entice those countries to
negotiate preferential trade treaties in exchange for
recognition, a move which would re-inforce Britain's
influence in that area.

Rush immediately demanded that

Britain recognize the existing governments in Latin
America as a prerequisite to Anglo-American co-operation.
Such a move might cause immediate severance of relations
with the Grand Alliance powers and defeat the purpose
of Britain's commercial interests in Latin America.
After about a month of unfruitful diplomatic sparring
between the two men, the subject was dropped.6
After the negotiations were suspended between Rush
and Canning the latter opened conferences with the
French Minister, Prince Jules de Polignac, in an effort
to prevent French interference in Latin America.

The

French were willing to go along with the desires of
Canning as long as they could secure the same trade
advantages as Great Britain.

On October 12, 1823 a

memorandum was signed by Canning and Polignac agreeing
to the abovementioned stipulations.

The Polignac

Memorandum (as the agreement came to be known) was
6H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States
(New York: st. Martin's Press, Inc., 1955), 373-374.
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kept under wraps for the time being because the
knowledge of the agreement throughout Europe could
have been injurious to the reputation of France.
Canning was rudely startled on December 24, 1823
by the arrival in London of a copy of President Monroe's
famous Monroe Doctrine.

That doctrine came as severe

blow to Canning who had no inkling of the possibility
of such a message, Monroe had told congress:
•••we should consider any attempt on their part
to extend their system to any portion of this
Hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety
••• we could not view any interposition for the
purpose of oppressing them•••than as the mani
festation of an unfriendly disposition towards
the United States•••Europe is still unsettled•••
Our policy•••is not too interfer� in the internal
concerns of any of its powers•.• l
Canning w as then faced with the threat of the United
States assuming the leadership role in Western Hemi
sphere�·which he felt he could not tolerate.

Canning's

fears became so great that he envisaged the United
States as the head of a confederation of the nations
of the Americas which would indeed stand as a great
threat to Britain and Europe as well.8 Even if the
United States did not r each that height, Canning
foresaw Britain's loss in trade and the negotiation of
7samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic Histor of the
United States (New York: Henry Holt, _1936�, 209-210 •.
8Allen, 378.
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preferential trade treaties between the Latin American
The United States by

nations and the United States.

assuming a dominant or leading role in the Americas
seemed to pose a great threat to British influence and
commerce.
Canning began to discard all doubts he may have
previously entertained concerning the possibility of
future conflicts and disagreements with the United
States.

He found it necessary to make known the con

tents of the Polignac Memorandum and his earlier
overtures to the United States in order for Britain
to resume her posture in the eyes of the Latin American
and European nations.

Canning chose that moment to

utter his famous pronouncement, "I called the New World
into existence to redress the balance of the Old" in
an attempt to exonerate himself.
The British Foreign Minister naturally took offence
at the American attempt to exclude European influences
from the New World.

He felt that the United States

had implied that the Western Hemisphere had become a
special sphere of influence for the United States.
Almost immediately Canning began efforts to subvert
the role of the United State� by denying the validity
of the Monroe Doctrine.

The next step, however, was a

more vigorous plan of action.

Canning instructed his
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representatives to the 1826 Panama Congress to work
against any American schemes for attaining hegemony in
Latin America and generally speaking, to

oppose�.•;;

any plan adding to the influence of the United States.9
The most galling point for Canning was the exclusion

of European colonization in the New World, even though
the Monroe Doctrine did not oppose existing European
establishments.

Canning pointed out that the boundaries

of the United States were as yet unsettled.

This led

him to contend that the United States had practically
established the Western Hemisphere as a "land reserve"
for the future expansionist policies of the United
States.
Although in 1823 the people of the United States
were slowly growing cognizant of their potential and
were proud of their achievements, there does not appear
to have been any reason to fear a great power struggle
between the United States and Great Britain.

However,

mutual distrust led the two nations to take what each
felt to be necessary precautions, and often positive
action, to foil the plans of the other.

As has been

previously mentioned, Great Britain feared the loss
of influence and particularly commerce in Latin America
to the United States.

That fear was well-founded, but

the acGu�ation that the United States hoped to eventu-
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ally lead a confederation of American states was based
on the overactive imagination of vanning.

Americans

at that time were proving themselves to be very
ambitious, but they were not quite fulfilling Canning's
expectations.
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who had been
the moving spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, was following
a policy which would give the United States a relatively
free hand with the lands which were on the Western
frontier for future settlement.

No formal American pol

icy called for the acquisition of the entire Hemisphere,
nor would it ever.

As history would later reveal there

were several leaders in American history who would call
for aggrandizement of greater areas, but not of the
entire hemisphere.

As a matter of fact, the United

States went into a state of near isolation after the
announcement of the Monroe Doctrine (isolated from
European affairs at any rate) and seemed to stay out
of the world picture.
The Monroe Doctrine drew a response from Great
Britain that was largely undeserved.

After announcing

the doctrine the United States seemed bent on proving
that it meant nothing by its announcement more than it
wished to be left alone.

In Central America the

British were allowed to continue their intrigues
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unmolested.

The United States appeared to have only

meant the doctrine to apply to lands contiguous to its
borders and not the entire hemisphere, contrary to
Canning's suspicions.

However, the British continued

their programs of intrigue and politics to obtain a
solid foothold in the Caribbean in order to arrest any
future attempts of the United States and to further
their own commercial interests.

In order to accomplish

these ends Great Britain found it necessary to consol
idate her positions in the Bay Islands, the Mosquito
Shore, and the Belize settlement.

III.

BEGINNING OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
STRUGGLE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

British Complicity In The Collapse of the United
Provinces of Central America
In the previous chapter the position of the Central
American Republic in relation to the disputed Hritish
settlements, particularly Belize, was indicated.

The

Central Americans expressed the opinion that they in
herited the Spanish title to all of the Spanish
possessions in Central America.

If that premise had

been acceptable, Great Britain would have been in the
same position in Belize as she had been when the
Spanish held sovereignty.

The only change would have

been that Central America would have been the sovereign
power.

The Central Americans attempted to make good

their claims to the territory but Hritain, as it has
been previously mentioned, recognized only the Spanish
title to the territory.
At first appearances the British position on
Spanish sovereignty seems to be rather silly but upon
closer examination it appears more reasonable.

Although

Spain was no longer in effective control of her former
Central American possessions, she still claimed sov
ereignty out of a rather vain hope that she would one
day recover the errant colonies.
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Although it probably
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galled many British subjects in Central America, the
government in London recognized the Spanish claim to
Central America for the purpose of maintaining a
reasonably legitimate position there.

In 1834 new conflicts arose between the Central

Americans and the settlers at Belize.

The settlers

had previously asked for formal British colonial status,
they did so again and seemed to be considerably more
serious this time.

They called a convention of

delegates and adopted a colonial form of government.
After changing the name from Belize to British Honduras
they petitioned London for acceptance as a colony.1
That action prompted Palmerston to follow a course
which he had considered earlier; negotiation with
Spain for the cession of the rights to the Belize
settlement to Great Britain.

In 1835 these negotiations

were initiated but without much hope for success.

The

Spanish government simply did not care to pursue the
matter with a great deal of enthusiasm, so the British
Minister to Madrid decided to drop the subject.2 With
the conclusion of the attempt to secure sovereignty
over the territory from Spain it appears Great Britain
1Williams, 34.
2-l_oc. cit. , 35.
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simply relied on its former treaties with Spain and
ignored the demands of the Central Americans.
The history of the Central American Republic was
short and quite explosive.

Perhaps the major problem

of the Republic was one which has affected many new
and revolutionary nations up until the present day:
the overzealousness of the revolutionaries in their
cause which bred intolerance towards any deviation from
a particular pattern or scheme.

There were two major

revolutionary groups; the Liberals and the Monarchists.
The former preferred a republic of sorts while the
Monarchists obviously preferred a King.

The two

factions, thus diametrically opposed to each other,
proved to be quite intolerant in their relations with
each other.

Neither faction controlled the Republic

for long because of the factionalism among the five
states (Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala).

This factionalism and civil war never ceased

during the history of the country and quite obviously
was much to the liking of Great Britain.

Even in the

face of threats and acts of territorial aggrandizement
by Britain the Central Americans could not unite long
enough to deal with the problem •.
For reasons just mentioned Great Britain ignored
the demands and threats of the Central Americans.

Also
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for those reasons it proved expedient for Britain's
agents to intervene in the domestic affairs of the
Central American Republic and add;to the chaos, thus
making life easier for the colonists in British
Honduras.3 There is little doubt that-Great Britain
realized the advantages of the disintegration of the
Central American Republic and actively worked toward
4
that end.
When that disinte�ration came in 1838,
Great Britain's. position in Central America was the
strongest it had ever been.

In opposition to British

Honduras were Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador.

Costa

Rica was in the midst of a border dispute with Nicaragua,
and Guatemala now was growing fearful of American
ambitions in Mexico.5
The Establishment of the Mosquito Protectorate
Although the British settlement in British Honduras
appeared to be the major British territory in the region,
the Mosquito Shore was about to become Britain's most
3Travis, 34.
410c. cit., 3 .
5
5British agents were growing fearful of the threat
of American expansion into Central America and were
quite vocal about their opinions. The possibilities
of American annexation of Texas appeared to be only a
step in the direction of Cen�ral America.
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significant foothold in Central America.

Mention has

been made of the alliances concluded as early as 1655
between Great Britain and the Mosquito kingdom.

The

precedent of the early alliances and the Mosquito
territorial cession of 1740 to Captain Robert Hodgson
were merely witness to the friendship that existed
between the two peoples.

In 1816 that friendship was

again demonstrated by the coronation of the Mosquito
King at Belize by the British.

In 1825, the British

crowned a Mosquito King but with less enthusiasm than
before.

It appears as if Britain were still apprehensive

about her position in Central America and chose to
consolidate the Belize settlement rather than risk
overextension on the Mosquito Shore.

The usual flow

of gifts from the British to the Mosquitos slowed to
a trickle until the late 1830's.

At that time Britain's

position seemed to be growing more secure with the
weakenins of the Central American republic and she
was rekindling plans for the Mosquito Shore.
It was really not until the appointment of
Alexander MacDonald to the superintendent's post at
Belize in 1840 that Britain began to evolve a well
organized policy concernin� the Mosquito Shore.
MacDonald was a rather zealous man who felt the need
to control the isthmian transit routes in order to
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maintain British commercial superiority.

About the

time of MacDonald's appojntment many people within the
United States and Great Britain were beginning to
appreciate the necessity for a shorter route to the
Pacific from the Atlantic Ocean.

There was also a

great deal of distrust between Britain and the United
States concerning each other's motives in Central
America.
Shortly after his appointment, MacDonald discovered
the scope of the "Anglo-Mosquito alliance" while examin
ing old records of Belize.

He felt the alliances and

protection �iven by the British to the Mosquitos for
two hundred years could work to great British advantages.
The first positive act he completed was to have himself
appointed as regent in the rulin� King's will.

Upon

the Kfn�s death in 1840 MacDonald became the acting
regent and appointed his private secretary, Patrick
Walker, as the "supervisor of Mosquito affairs".
Walker sailed for Bluefields where he established his
capitol of "Mosquitia" and began his rule.
It was not long before Walker and MacDonald were
in the midst of several dis�1tes with the Central
American nations which were engaged in disputing the
territorial sovereignty of the Mosquitos with Britain.
MacDonald was aware of the desirability of the possession
...........
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of the east coasts of Nicara�ua, Honduras, and Costa
Rica with reference to isthmian transit mainly because
the coast of NicaraPUa included the mouth of the San
Juan river.

A cursory glance at a map of Central

America shows the obvious potential of.an isthmian
transit route which travels up the San Juan river to
Lake Nicaragua near the Pacific coast of Nicaragua.
Any nation or transit company following that route
would find it necessary to obtain permission from the
controlling government of San Juan del Norte.

With

the British literally controlling the mouth of the
river no nation could traverse the isthmus without
British permission.
In Au�st, 1841, MacDonald moved to secure the
situation just described.

He sailed with the Mosquito

King to San Juan del Norte in a Hritish war ship
accompanied by another war. ship flying the Mosquito
colors.

Colonel Quijano, the Nicaraguan commandant

of San Juan del Norte was told that he must acknowledge
the sovereignty of the Mosquito King over that port
city.

The Colonel declined to do so and w as summarily

taken prisoner by MacDonald.

After proclaiming the

authority of the Mosquito King in San Juan del Norte
MacDonald then announced that Great Britain recognized
the authority of the Mosquito King and would not view
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"with indifference" any attempt to usurp his right.
The recognition of the Mosquito King's sovereignty
brought an immediate chorus of protests from most of the
nat·ions. 6
C entra 1 American
.

With the siezure of San

Juan by the Mosquito King and MacDonald's recognition
of the King's sovereignty the British secured their
position in Central America.

Although there were some

muffled cries within the United States, Americans,
generally speaking, were caught up in their domestic
problems and the issue of Texas annexation.
Throughout the history of British affairs in
Central America there were many men and events which
stand out in retrospect.

Alexander MacDonald was

fortunate enough to have been on the scene at a time
when British influence was at a crossroads.

MacDonald

siezed that opportunity to earn a place in the history
of isthmian diplomacy.

His ability to foresee the

approaching conflict with the United States and to
realize the importance of securing the Mosquito pro
tectorate enabled him to establish British influence
even more securely in Central American affairs.
6williams, 41. Honduras was the only nation that
did not oppose Britain's move. In fact, Honduras like
wise recognized the Mosquito sovereignty. At that time
Honduras desired to become a British protectorate and
was willing to bear almost any burden in order to
achieve that end�
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MacDonald secured that position at a most propitious
moment, for the United States was entering an era which
would thrust it into a position diametrically opposed
to that of Great Britain.
Growing American Distrust of British Activities
In Mexico and Texas
In any discussion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty it
becomes necessary to consider the significance of the
Texan revolution against Mexico.

Most writers of the

period treat that revolution in a rather cursory
manner.7 However, this revolution is a significant
k�y to American involvement in the isthmian diplomacy
of 1850.

During the Texas revolution and the period

thereafter prior to the annexation of Texas, British
plans for excluding the United States from Central
America came into the open.

The annexation of Texas

eventually resulted in war with Mexico, which in turn,
resulted in the acquisition of California by the
United States.

With the acquisition of California

the need for an isthmian canal was brought into sharp
focus.

Thus the Texan revolution eventually resulted

in the inauguration of a new phase in American foreign
policy aimed at a particular rival, Great Britain, with
7rra D. Travis, Mary
Van Alstyne, etc.

w.

Williams, Richard

w.
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a set goal, the acquisition of canal rights.

Until the conflicts with Great Britain over the

disposition of Texas in the 18 40'� Americans were

generally unaware that the British had been following
a policy of containment in the American Southwest.8

Canning hardened that policy in 1825 after his treat

ment from the Monroe Doctrine by striving to maintain

the strength of Mexico as a buffer state against
further American expansion.

Because of British

commercial and political involvement in Mexico it

was natural in 1836 for Britain to hope for a Mexican

re-conquest of Texas.

Therefore, Palmerston did not

award recognition to the Texan representative who
approached him in 1837.

However, within a short

period, British commercial involvement in Texas helped
to change Palmerston's attitude.9 It also became
apparent to the British by 1838 that Mexico could not
re-conquer her former province.

Upon arriving at

that conclusion Palmerston renewed his poticy of

8
Ephraim
D. Adams, British Interests and Activities
In Texas 1838 146 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1910), 1.
5
9
Professor
E. D. Adams also compiled a rather en
lightening volume of British diplomatic correspondence
from the period 1838-1846 which �ives the reader great
insight into British attitudes concerning the Texas
controversey. Ephraim D. Adams, British Diplomatic
Corres ondence Concernin the Re ublic of Texas--18 8-1846
Austin, Texas: The Texas State Historical Association,
117
9 ).
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containment of the United States by attempting to
secure Texas as an ally.
Palmerston first attempted to trade diplomatic
recognition to Texas for a treaty granting the British
the "right of search", which could have effectively
curtailed the slave trade with North America.

He was

willing to recognize the independence of Texas because
he felt that a strong, independent nation such as Texas
could become an effective buffer to future American
aggrandizement in the Southwest.

Great Britain also

sought the development of a cotton growing center in
Texas which would compete with southern United States
and present an alternative source of raw cotton in the
event of a war between the United States and Great
Britain.
While Palmerston was attempting to secure the
influence of Britain in Texas Americans were also hard
at work in behalf of their own interests in Texas.
During the revolution many sympathetic Americans sought
to aid the Texans by enlisting both volunteers and money
for the Texas cause.

The United States, however, was

not unified in its effort to aid the Texans.

Although

the people of the South and the West were strongly
in favor of the revolution and eventual annexation,
the people of the North were opposed to supporting the
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revolt.

The cause of the disagreement immediately came

to the fore; the North feared the admission of Texas to
the Union as one or more slave states.

Largely due to

Northern opposition, the United States would not
immediately annex Texas, Mexico would not recognize
Texan independence but persisted in threatening in
vasion.

Texas sought help in Europe.

In exchange for

close commercial ties with France and Great Britain
(particularly the latter) Texas hoped to attain
political and military support from those countries.
Great Britain later (1844) offered to mediate between

Mexico and Texas and to attempt to gain Mexican recog
nition of Texas in exchange for the abolition of
slavery.10
Whether or not Texan diplomacy was intended to
secure American annexation by playing on the fears of

.....-�.

American politicians is still unknown.

From all

·appearances the Texans threatened a close alliance
with Great Britain in order to persuade the American
legislators to annex the Republic of Texas.

The fact

remains, however, that Texas did negotiate treaties

with Great Britain and presumably would have abided
by those agreements if the United States had not
lOAdams, British Interests • • • • , 146.
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afforded Texas the protective cloak of annexation.

The

public and the political forces of the United States
began to debate the motives of the British in Texas
and became uneasy about growing British influence in
that nation.

Although the annexation of Texas did not

receive the necessary two thirds vote in the Senate
in 1844, the election of Polk in that year was viewed
by many as a mandate for expansion.

In December 1844

Tyler again submitted the annexation proposal, this
time in the form of a joint resolution by both the
It received
the necessary majorities in February 1845.11
Senate and the House of Representatives.

The British policy of containment in the Southwest,
then, met with almost complete failure.

The United

States secured the state of Texas and was already
looking west of Texas to the Pacific coast.

The

containment policy of the British, in actuality, gained
them nothing.

During the diplomatic encounters,

British efforts to contain the United States in its
"drive to the West" were apparent; this merely served

as an incentive to the Americans.

The knowledge that

the British had attempted to impede American expansion
aroused a distrust of almost all things British,
11Alexander DeConde, A Histor of American Forei n
•
Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1
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particularly when those "things" were in any possible
way competitive with American plans.
Although the official policy of the United States
does not appear to have encompassed the acquisition of
Mexico and Central America the suspicions aroused by
the Texan revolution and the eventual war with Mexico
certainly appeared to the British to be well founded.
Therefore, the British grew to be quite wary over the
designs of the rapidly growing young giant, the
United States.

Britain was fearful of losing her

commercial and political influence throughout Central
America and possibly all of Latin America.

American

control of Central America would also have meant one
other vastly important thing to Great Britain; the
exclusive control of an isthmian transit route,
possibly even a canall

The control of that route by

such a powerful economic rival as the United States
simply could not be countenanced by Britain.

The fear

of such a situation led Britain to increase the extent
of her claims throughout Central America in order to
consolidate the British position in the face of possible
future demands from the United Statea.12
As it has been shown above, the distrust was a
two way street.

The United States had not yet overcome

12williams, 46.
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it's fear and distrust of Great Britain from as far
back as her Revolutionary days and the activities of
the British in Mexico and Texas certainly failed to
ingratiate them in the eyes of Americans.

Many Americans

were fearful of Hritish designs on the Pacific coast
(California and Oregon) and felt the United States
should secure these territories as soon as possible
in order to keep them from the clutches of the British.
Without entering a lenghty narrative of the
Mexican War it will suffice to say that the United
States not only made good her claims to Texas, but
also acquired New Mexico and California through the

Treaty of Guadeloupe-Hidalgo. 13

The acquisition of

California completed the American claims to the
Pacific coast because the Oregon Territory had been

obtained-through the Oregon Treaty of June 15, 1846.14
The new possessions of the United States soon pointed
out a glaring deficiency in the American communications
system.

Although railroads were beginning to prove

their efficiency in e.astern United States, the practi
cability of a transcontinental railroad was unheard of

13Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International

Acts of the United States (Washington: United States·
Government Printing Office, 1937), Vol. V, 207.
14ibid., .
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in 1848.

For many years Americans had been aware of

the potentialities of a trans-isthmian canal in Central
America but no formal governmental policy was developed.
With the acquisition of California and the beginning
of a new era in westward movement all modes of trans
portation to the Pacific coast were exploited.

The

possibility of developing an isthmian transit route
immediately became a necessity for the maintenance of
political, commercial and military control over the
new western territories and states.
Palmerston Defines the Mosquito Protectorate
Prior to.the war between Mexico and the United
States it became apparent to Palmerston that the
American appetite for land in the West would not
stop with the acquisition of Texas.

Inasmuch as

Mexico had stated that the American annexation of
Texas would mean war between the neighbors it was a
foregone conclusion to assume that the United States
would attempt to acquire California upon Texas'
annexation.

(American demands for, and attempts to

purcha.s_e..1 California were well-known at that time.)
It was not too difficult for Palmerston to envisage
the future conflict over the trans-isthmian transit
rights in the light of the abovementioned conclusions.
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The future of British influence in Central America
would have been considerably dimmed if the United States
had been allowed to obtain an exclusive transit right.
The greatest loss to the British in that eventuality
would not have been in Central America, however.

Once

an isthmian canal was completed the American commercial
interests would have strengthened their continental
communications well enough to place the British interests
in the Orient in the gravest of dangers.

In view of such

a threat to British interests Palmerston set about
securing Central America against the policies of the
United States.
In 1847 the first step Palmerston was to instruct
Patrick Walker, the Mosquito superintendent, and
Frederick Chatfield, the British Consul-General for
Central America, to:

1) unearth the most authentic

information concerning the true nature of the boundaries
claimed by the Mosquito King and, 2) to submit their
(Chatfield's and Walker's) opinions concerning the
boundaries Britain ought to claim for the Mosquito
kingdom.

After a short time Walker and Chatfield re

ported back to Palmerston that they felt Britain ought
to support Mosquito claims along the Atlantic shoreline
from the Roman river in the north to the San Juan river
in the south.

The claims of the Mosquito King, however,
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were more considerable than those mentioned above.
Both Chatfield and Walker felt that the claim by the
Mosquito King that his domain extended as far south
as the Chiriqui lagoon in New Granada should be held in
reserve for possible future use.

They felt the claim

should only extend southward to the San Juan river

·-

because Costa Rica was in the hands of the Servile
party (monarchists) which favored British harassment
of Nicaragua.

However, both men felt, in view of the

chaotic Central American situation, the claims ought
to be held in reserve for possible future use by the
British.15
Palmerston followed the advice of his agents and
authorized them on June 30, 1847 to inform the inter
ested governments of Central America that Great
Britain recognized the Mosquito kingdom to exist

""'·..,. ,
,.

within the northern boundary of the Roman river and
the southern boundary of the San Juan river.16
Palmerston's action seemed animated by the precedent
established by the former Belize superintendent,
Alexander MacDonald, in 1840.

In fact, after the

announcement of the British protectorate in 1848 over
1 5Travis, 41.
16loc. cit., 42-43.
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the Mosquito kingdom, Chatfield served up an ultimatum
to the Nicaraguan officials at San Juan del Norte.

Although MacDonald forcibly ejected the Nicaraguans

in 1841 the Nicaraguan government sent new representa
tives to San Juan del Norte where they served with
impunity until Chatfield's later ultimatum.
The Nicaraguan government protested and refused
to relinquish their position.

After the deadline

(January 1, 1848) for evacuation had passed Walker
entered San Juan del Norte at the head of British
armed forces, raised the Mosquito flag, and expelled
the Nicaraguans.

The Nicaraguan force retired to

Serapaqui up the San Juan river and built some forti
fications.

After Walker and the main British force

departed from San Juan del Norte the Nicaraguans
captured the remaining force and retired to Serapaqui.

Walker returned and destroyed the Nicaraguan defenses
and secured the river for the Mosquito King.
Nicaragua naturally protested the loss of her
entire Atlantic coastline to the British, but to no
avail.

She even appealed to the American Secretary of

State, James Buchanan, twice, also without effect.

The

Nicaraguan government sent Francisco Castellon to
London to negotiate with Palmerston in 1848.

Castellon

was simply given a cool treatment until he was prepared
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to return to Nicaragua.

At that time Palmerston in

formed Castellon that the Mosquito territory never
belonged to Spain because she did not conquer the
Indians.

Palmerston furth�r denied that Nicaragua

could claim sovereignty over the land even if Spain
did have title to it, on the grounds that Spain did
not recognize Nicaraguan independence.

Palmerston

claimed the Nicaraguans only gained the right to self
rule over the territories they occupied, not the
Mosquito Shore.17
Palmerston's position of denying that Spain ever
controlled the Mosquito Shore was a rejection of the
isthmian policies of Britain since 1783.

From that

year until 1848 Great Britain had recognized the
sovereignty of Spain over the Mosquito Shore.

Finally,

in 1848 Palmerston changed the British posture by
recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the
Mosquitoso

Palmerston also committed Great Britain

to protect the sovereignty of the Mosquito King from
the claims of the Nicaraguans (and the Hondurans).

In

view of the approaching conflict with the United States
over the isthmian transit route Palmerston's move to
control the most feasible route appears to be a wise,
although high-handed, one.
1710c. cit., 46-4 .
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IV.

EARLY AMERICAN ATTEMPrS TO SECURE
ISTHMIAN TRANSIT RIGHTS
The Bidlack Treaty

In any treatment of American isthmian diplomacy
it becomes necessary to examine closely the precondi
tions and stipulations of the Bidlack treaty negotiated
December 12, 1846.

Benjamin A. Bidlack was appointed

United States Charge d' Affaires to Bogota, New Granada
on May 14, 1845.

Bidlack was not sent to Bogota with

instructions to secure isthmian transit rights.

In

fact, he was sent with no specific instructions at
all!

As far as the American government was concerned

Charg{ Bidlack was appointed to his position merely to
fill a diplomatic vacancy.1
Pri�r to Bidlack, however, there had been several
diplomatic appointees to Bogota who had been sent there
with very specific instructions indeed.

An earlier

treaty of commerce and amity between the two nations,
dated October 3, 1824, had created a good deal of
friction.

In that treaty there existed a clause which

New Granada soon regretted c�lling for no discriminating
duties between the two nations.2 After many attempts
1 Miller, Vol. V, 146.
2ibid., 144. Soon after theratification of that
treaty New Granadan officials learned that the clause
calling for the abolition of discriminatory duties meant
52
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to have that clause abrogated, New Granada finally
allowed the treaty to lapse upon the conclusion of
its agreed upon twelve year life.

The United States

wished to re-establish the former conditions and
attempted to negotiate a new treaty with the New
Granadans.

The New Granadans, however, would have

nothing to do with the treaty proposals of the United
States which included the same stipulations that
proved so injurious to their economy in the past.
/

In 1843 William Blackford, then Charge d' Affairs,
renewed negotiations in a more cordial atmosphere· but
was forced to concede to the New Granadans several
points on discriminatory duties.

Blackford returned

to Washington in 1845 with the treaty for it's approval
by the Senate.

Although the Blackford treaty was the

most favorable agreement reached between the two

nations in years, the Senate failed to ratify it.3
Shortly before the Senate rejection of the treaty,
Bidlack was sent as Blackford's replacement with in
structions only concerning some claims difficulties
that New Granadan industries suffered from lack of
stimulation, a condition that remained uncured through
out much of Latin America until recently.

3 ibid., 145.

between the two countries.

Quite unexpectedly, Bidlack

found himself in a position of being responsible for
persuading the Granadans to accept new terms.

He

reported within a short time that the New Granadan
government was willing to meet the terms of the United
States.4 In a dispatch to Washington ,on November 27,
1846 he wrote:
-......·r�

.

I am anxiously awaiting authority and in
structions to make a Treaty with this government
abolishing the differential duties which are now
charged against us.
I have the promise of this Government to
make such a Treaty and am desirous of concluding
it at once as the government may change its views
hereafter.
I think it proper allso '[sic] to observe that
from various causes which I will not now stop to
mention I consider it important that a Treaty
should "imediately" (sic] be made with New Granada
securing to the Government of the United States
"the right of way across the Isthmus of Panama".
I think I have prepared the way for such a Treaty,
[,] But I have candidly advised the Secretary of
Foreign Relations, that I have not as yet any
special powers or instructions to act on either
of the above points. He has nevertheless signi
fied his willingness to open negociations (sic]
with me in reference to both in order that if we
should be fortunate enough to agree upon anything
satisfactory to the President of the United States
it may be presented to the Senate of the United
States at its approaching session. )

In recommending the negotiation of two treaties, Bidlack
4
Joseph B. Lockey, "A Neglected Aspect of Isthmian
Diplomacy", The American Historical Review, Vol. XLI,
(Jan., 1936), 297.

5Bidlack to Buchanan D.S. 11 Despatches, Colombia,
No. 28, November 27, 1846, quoted in Miller, Vol. V, 149 •.
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recognized the need for eliminating the discriminatory
duties and also the attainment of isthmian transit
rights.

Both were courses of action he felt his

government wished to pursue, but he still had received
neither instructions nor permission to negotiate for
such goals.

It must be remembered that Bidlack was

not sent to Bogota to obtain either of these ends but
he was aware of their importance and the value placed
upon their attainment by the United States.
Although Manuel M. Mallarino, the Secretary of
Foreign Relations for New Granada, knew that Bidlack
had not received instructions, nor the powers to
commit ·t"he United States in any treaty, he was still
willing to negotiate a treaty.

Bidlack suddenly found

himself able to dictate terms on discriminatory duties
to Mallarino; a feat that none of Bidlack's predecessors
had been able to accomplish�

However, the American

agent found that Mallarino wished to include an
isthmian transit agreement in the same treaty.6

Not

only was the isthmian transit agreement to be included
in the treaty for peace, amity and commerce, but
Mallarino wanted the United States to' guarantee the
neutrality of the isthmus.

Inasmuch as past American

......
-�- policy had been opposed to guarantees of sovereignty
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Bidlack felt that a guarantee of the neutrality of the
isthmus would not be a violation of American diplomatic
precedent.
Charge Bidlack believed that he had prepared the
way for the treaty but a comparison of. contemporary
conditions in Latin America in 1845 and the content of
Bidlack's treaty reveals otherwise.

In the first

place, Mallarino was fearful of the designs of Great
Britain on the Central American isthmus and British
intrigues with New Granada's neighbors.

In view of

American expansionism, British officials in Central
America attempted to consolidate their position on the
isthmus.

At that time New Granadans were suspiciously

observing the British activities in the Mosquito
protectorate.

The New Granadans also feared the

possibility of the return from exile of Juan Jose Flores,
a former threat to New Granadan territorial sovereignty
while the Ecuadoran strong man.

Flores had earlier

fled to Europe where he immediately received covert
encouragement from Lord Palmerston in his efforts to
assemble a mercenary army from Ireland and other
military supplies.7
Although Bidlack wrote that he was responsible for
7Lockey, 301.
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the favorable conditions of the pending negotiations
it is obvious that he either overlooked the contemporary
conditions or greatly exaggerated his personal role.
At any rate, it becomes apparent in the light of the
existing circumstances that Secretary Mallarino was
forced to sacrifice the previously sacred discriminatory
duties in order to obtain an American guarantee of New
Granadan sovereignty over the Panama isthmus.

At first

glance such a guarantee seems to be a small price to
pay for the reduction of a nation's discriminatory
duties.

However, Secretary Mallarino had the perspic

acity to realize that the only real threat to the
territorial rights of New Granada lay in the isthmian
ambitions of Great Britain.

What better way to protect

the rights of New Granada in the face of the British
threat than to secure the support of Britain's greatest
opponent?.
Even though Mallarino obtained territorial security
for New Granada in the Bidlack Treaty it must not be
intimated that the United States was duped into an
unprecedented foreign involvement.

The United States,

in actuality, risked very little in guaranteeing the
neutrality of the Panama isthmus.

In the first place,

Great Britain maintained no claims to isthmian territory
any further south than the Chiriqui Lagoon.8 Although
.

·-

8williams, 47. Although the British officially
recognized Mosquito sovereignty only as far as a few
miles south of the San Juan River, they held in reserve
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that territory was within the New Granadan borders it

did not lay within the boundaries of the Panama isthmus.
Inasmuch as the British were the only real threat to

New Granada's isthmian territory the United States
risked very little and gained a good deal through the
treaty.

According to at least one historian9 the Bidlack

treaty signalled the end of one era and the beginning
of another in Latin American affairs •. In their attempt
to remain competitive with the United States, the

"'·.,... British committed many agressions against the Latin
American nations.

Until that time (1840's) Latin

America had relied upon the British for protection but
they finally grew to fear the British designs.

New

Granada was the first to claim a new protector in the
United States.
The Hise Treaty
The acceptance of the Bidlack treaty by the Senate
on June 3, 1848 seemed a manifestation of the spirit
permeating the United States concerning the Anglo- ·
American conflict.

With the American plans for expansion

the Mosquito King's claim to the Chiriqui Lagoon.

9 Lockey, 305.
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to the Pacific coast in full blossom Americans would
brook no interference with their "manifest destiny"
from any quarter.

As early as December, 1845 President

Polk had declared that the United States would not
"in silence permit any European interference in the
North American Continent 11 • 1O Although President Polk
was referring specifically to Texas and Oregon he was
alive to the possibility of application of that prin
ciple to Central America also.11 At that stage of
affairs, however, Polk was aware of the probability of
war with Mexico and could ill afford another enemy.
As a matter of fact, instead of directly conflicting
with the British schemes in Central America the Bidlack
treaty was negotiated in order to obtain an isthmian
route that was not claimed by Great Britain.
Although President Polk managed not to antagonize
the British in Central America during the Mexican War,
he did try to remain alert for British aggressions.
Shortly after Alexander MacDonald, the Belize superinten
dent, issued his ultimatum to the Nicaraguan officials at
1OJames D. Richardson (ed.), A Com ilation of the
Messa es and Pa ers of the Presidents 1
-1
(Was ngton: Government Printing Office, 1

398.

11navid Y. Thomas, One Hundred Years of the Monroe
Doctrine (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1923), 86-87.
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San Juan del Norte, (see p.38) Polk decided to take

........,.._, steps to counter British schemes in Central America •
The appointment of Elijah Hise as Charge d' Affaires
to Guatemala was his first step in that direction.
Hise was first instructed to ascertain the extent of
the British aggressions, particularly on the Mosquito
Shore, and to attempt to create a degree of cohesion
among the five Central American nations.

The latter

effort was a naive attempt to achieve re-unification
of the Central American state which had little chance
for success.

If successful, however, it could have

hopefully become an effective deterrent to British
aggressions.12
Upon reaching his Central American destination in
the autumn of 1848 Charge" Hise found that Nicaragua,
Honduras and Salvador were allied in opposition to the
Hritish aggressions and were naturally sympathetic to
the American representative.

As has been stated earlier,

Guatemala was fearful of American plans for Central
America.
fears.

One of Hise's assignments was to allay those
At the time of Hise's arrival in Central

America, Costa Rica was in the hands of the Monarchist
party which was very sympathetic to British plans and
was also in the midst of a border dispute with Nicaragua.
12Travis, 8.
5

61
Britain was certainly a natural and desirable ally for
Costa Rica and for that reason the latter nation found
it expedient to oppose American plans.
It was only a matter of weeks before Charge"Hise
became convinced that British agents were attempting
to secure both coasts of the isthmus, which would give
them control of any conceivable canal route.13 In
December, 1848, Hise wrote to his government in
Washington explaining his views and asking for per
mission to negotiate treaties with the Central American
states which could thwart the British plans and promote
American ambitions.

Again, in May, 1849, Hise wrote

Washington pleading for permission to negotiate transit
treaties with the Central Americans.14 He received no
such permission, however.
Finally, in exasperation, Charg{ Hise negotiated
treaties of commerce and friendship with Nicaragua and
Honduras.

After signing those treaties, Hise negotiated

another-treaty with Nicaragua which granted the United
States transit rights through that Central American
nation.

In exchange for perpetual transit rights and

the authorization for an American canal company to

13 loc. cit., 59.

14Williams,

57.
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assume construction of a canal, Hise was forced to

pledge American guarantees of sovereignty for Nicaragua.15
Before condemning Elijah Hise for conducting his
"independent foreign policy", as his contemporaries did,
certain attendant circumstances merit consideration.
In the first place, the acquisition of California and

New Mexico by the United States and the discovery of
gold in the former territory created a very strong
demand for a more expeditious route to the Pacific
Ocean.- As an agent of the United States, Hise felt
himself bound to protect the interests of his country
and to also be foresighted in carrying out his duties.
He realized the need for a shorter route to the new
American possession.

Hise was endeavoring to protect

American interests from the British.

He felt the

British Consul-general, Frederick Chatfield, was
attempting to eliminate American influence in Central
America.

Such an endeavor was anathema to American

plans, Hise thought, because it might jeopradize develop
ment by the United States of transisthmian communications,
and thus would be detrimental to the future of American
territories on the west coast of North America.16 · In
the light of these conditions it is difficult to condemn
15Thomas, 89.
16Travis, 61.

/
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Elijah Hise for overzealousness.

Rather, he deserves

praise for his perspicuity in dealing with the ambitions
of his British counterpart, Frederick Chatfield.
The Squier Treaty
Although Charg{Hise had labored hard, and not
ineffectively, in behalf of the United States, his
treaty with Nicaragua was rejected by his superiors.
The new Whig administration under President Zachary

/

Taylor replaced Hise with Ephraim G. Squier as Charge
d' Affaires to Central America.

Although President

Taylor and his Secretary of State, John M. Clayton,
were less aggressive in the field of foreign affairs
than President Polk had been, they promised to main
tain the American opposition to the exclusive control
of an isthmian transit by one nation (particularly
Great Britain).17
)

In his instructions to Charge Squier, Secretary
Clayton maintained the right of Nicaragua to the
Mosquito Shore.

Clayton asserted that the United

States recognized the earlier Spanish claim to Central
Americ� __J:>y right of discovery.

He observed that

although the British had often violated Spanish
sovereignty they ultimately recognized Spanish claims

17 loc. cit., 62.
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in several subsequent Anglo-Spanish treaties.

Since

the Spanish title to Central America had been considered

valid by the British, Clayton implied.the British had

,

·t-o

contradicted themselves by recognizing the Mosquito

,

claims and not those of the Central American states.

Clayton observed that the Central American states had

inherited title to the former Spanish claims and that

those states had contested all other claims to the

territories.

In essence, Clayton recognized Central

American claims to the Mosquito Shore and not those of
the British.18
The Secretary of State further declared that the

United States sought the development of a canal through
Central America and would brook no interference from

Britain.

Concerning the ownership of the canal Clayton

said that the United States desired "no monopoly of the
right of way for our commerce, and we cannot submit
to it if claimed for that of any other nation.11 1 9

Squier was also instructed to negotiate treaties of
commerce and amity with Nicaragua and Honduras.

The

treaty with the former nation, however, was to contain
a clause guaranteeing citizens of the United States
18ibid.

19Thomas, 90.
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the same isthmian transit rights as the citizens of
Nicaragua.

Squier was instructed, however, to avoid

guarantees of sovereignty for Nicaragua.

He could

only join in a mutual promise of protection for the
transit company by Nicaragua and the United States.

/ Squier
Upon his arrival in Central America, Charge
.

immediately set about his duties and was warmly received
by his hosts.

One man who did not receive Squier.too

warmly, however, was Frederick Chatfield, the British
Consul-general to Central America.

Chatfield had been

warned by the government in London to be alert to the
activities of Elijah Hise and had been outmaneuvered
by that American agent.

He did not need a second

admonition to remind him of his failure in his contest
with Hise.

During Squier's tour of duty in Central

America a strong rivalry developed between the two
men, each trying to outmaneuver the other for the
benefit of his country.
Squier's first accomplishment at his new post
was to secure a contract between Nicaragua and the
American Canal Company in August, 1849.

His next step

was to negotiate a treaty with Nicaragua which granted
the United States the right of transit through
Nicaragua.

The two nations promised to defend the

canal company in its' endeavor and also to protect
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the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the canal route •.

As

long as the canal remained in the hands of American
citizens both countries guaranteed its' neutrality •.
Any nation wishing to enter the same agreement was
welcome to do so, thereby dis-spelling any allusion
to exclusive American contro1.20
Chatfield, however, was not idle during Squier's
negotiations.

Prior to Squier's arrival in Central

America the British Consul-general had advocated to
the home government the siezure of Pacific coast ports
in order to consolidate the British grip on possible
canal routes.

He maintained that such a move could

be attributed to Central Ame·rican indebtedness to
the British government and banks.

Although Chatfield

wrote to Lord Palmerston many times advising the
siezure of Central American territory he was always
rebuffed by the For.eign Minister.

Chatfield was not

easily swayed from his goal, however, and decided to
take steps to obtain a strategic point on the Pacific
coast of Central America for his government.

He

settled upon Tigre island in the �ulf of Fonseca as
the most desirable target.

In January, 1849 Chatfield

notified the Honduran government that Great Britain
20williams, 63.

67
had placed a lien on Tigre island and would sieze it
if Honduras did not meet her debts.21 Palmerston,
shortly afterwards, advised Chatfield that Great
Britain's interests would be better served by the

payment of debts than by the siezure of an island.22
The rivalry between Chatfield and.Squier continued
as Squier moved to checkmate his counterpart.

In the

autumn of 1849 Squier negotiated the cession of Tigre
island by Honduras to the United States for a period
of eighteen months in order to avoid the pending
British siezure.

Chatfield countered immediately by

ordering siezure by Naval Captain J. A. Paynter of the
islands claiming proprietary rights to it due to the
lien established in the previous January.

Then, the

commander of the British naval forces in the Caribbean,
Admiral Sir Phipps Hornby, ordered the naval force to
evacuate Tigre island because he knew Lord Palmerston
would become upset over Chatfield's action.

Both the

American and British agents �n Central America had
obviously exceeded their instructions and their actions
had aroused mutual antagonisms.

Britain and the United

States disavowed the actions of their.agents because
the two governments had entered into negotiations con-

211 OC.

22.b'd
]. ].

.

CJ.
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cerning the Central American isthmian difficulties by
that time.
Although Secretary Clayton and Foreign Minister
Palmerston feared the motives of each other concerning
isthmian affairs neither man wanted to .i:'isk war over
0

the probleme

The difficulties arising. from the isthmian

problem were mainly generated by mutual suspicion and
,.

.,..,,,

the overzealousness of the two nations' agents in
Central America.23 Men such as Elijah Hise, E. G.
Squier, Frederick Chatfield and Patrick Walker were
dedicated to the best interests of their countries but
managed to involve those nations in dangerous programs.
The actions of these men, happily, did not always
reflect the advice of their superiors.

In fact, they

often went beyond the authority vested in them.
Britain's Frederick Chatfield attempted to follow
the previous pattern of Patrick Walker in securing
strategic isthmian points in order to maintain British
control of the isthmian transit routes�
was basically of a preventive nature.

That policy
If the United

States had obtained exclusive control of a transiv
route across the Central American isthmus and stabilized
23Julius w. Pratt, A History of United States
Foreign Polic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1 �57), 289.
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its' west coast territories it would have been conceiv

able that the Americans might gain commercial superiority
in the Orient.

The several military advantages that

would have accrued to the United States would have made
the situation intolerable to the Briti.sh government and
people.

Chatfield and his subordinates throughout

Central America felt the United States desired a
monopoly over these transit routes and labored vigor
ously to thwart the endeavors of the Americans (although
Lord Palmerston cautioned Chatfield to be more tact
ful).
The British agents located in Central America
worked against any exclusive control of trans-isthmian
routes by the Americans, but in the process appeared
to be attempting, themselves, to secure exclusive con
trol over the future canal routes for Great Britaint

That action appeared to the American agents in Central
America to be an attempt to deprive the United States
of the means of access her western possessions and
hence to threaten their securitye

In actuality, the

United States sought no exclusive control of a canal
route.24 nor did Great Britainc The activities of the
24Julius w. Pratt maintains that the Hise and
Squier treaties gave the United States exclusive con
trol of t he transit routes. The Hise treaty does call
for exclusive transit rights but the treaty was not
considered by the Taylor administration. Mr. Hise was
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representatives of Britain and the United States in
Central America managed to arouse public opinion on
both sides of the Atlantic but, fortunately, cooler
heads eventually prevailed.

not advised by Secretary Buchanan to negotiate for the
rights of transit that he obtained. The Squier treaty
obtained transit rights for the United States but these
rights cannot be construed as exclusive since any other
nation could obtain those rights by assuming the same
guarantees. Squier was, in fact, advised by Secretary
Clayton not to obtain exclusive rights.

V.

THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY
Negotiations In London

Until the spring of 1849 both Great Britain and
the United States had relied upon their. agen-ts in
Central America to ascertain each other's motives in
that area.

In view of the activities and suspicions

of those agents it is not surprising that the two
nations were at loggerheads over the situation.

On

March 8, 1849, John M. Clayton became the United
States Secretary of State and soon set in motion a
program designed to bring about the development of a
trans-isthmian canal.
On April 30 Clayton wrote to George Bancroft,
United States Minister to London, directing him to
inform Francisco Castellon, Nicaraguan Charg( d'
Affaires to London, that the United States had decided
to accede to Nicaragua's request to attempt to induce

the British to give up claims to Nicaraguan territory.1
He also instructed Bancroft to advise Castellon to
"continue firm in asserting the rights of his government • • e .. 2 Clayton v s letter of April 30 appears to
1Williams, 68.

2 U.S. Documents., serial no.

quoted in Williams, 68.
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579, document 75, 224,
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have been the turning point in the American treatment

of the problem because a few days later (May 2) Secre

tary Clayton wrote to Bancroft, giving him special
instructions concerning the British involvement in the
Nicaraguan territorial question.

Until that time the

United States had contented itself with allowing
American agents in Central America to deal with the
issue in that region.

Clayton's new instructions

stated the American position in relation to the issue
of sovereignty in Central America.

The United States

recognized the former Spanish title to Central America
and the subsequent claim to inheritance of it by the
Central.American states.

Clayton maintained that the

Mosquito Indians were merely a tribe of savages, and
not a sovereign state; thus, that they could not
possibly claim sovereignty to the Mosquito Shore and
were subject to the laws of the nations in which they

Inasmuch as the United States had been re

lived.

quested by Nicaragua to investigate British complicity
in maintaining the Mosquito protectorate, Clayton said
that the United States felt bound to demand an explan
ation of the British position on the issue.
'

Bancroft

was further instructed to question Lord Palmerston
·t�

.

·concerning the motives of Great Britain in Central
America.3 Did Britain intend to settle or colonize
.
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any part of the territory, and upon what principle?
Did the British claim the San Juan river in any way?
If Lord Palmerston indicated that Britain planned
to continue to maintain the right to any of those
points, Bancroft was directed to point out that the
United States did not desire the exclusive control of
an isthmian canal and felt it inexpedient for any other
great maritime power to do so.

Bancroft was to ex

plain that the United States disclaimed any such
interest in Central America but could not tole rate the
violation of the territorial rights of others, particu
larly if the violation led to control of a trans
isthmian highway by a great maritime power.4 If
Palmerston would not acquiesce in the face of the
American argument Bancroft was directed to present a
formal protest to Great Britain.
Bancroft immediately set about following Clayton's
instructions but was delayed by Palmerston's unavail
ability for an interview.

In August, 1849 Bancroft

managed to secure such an interview.

At that inter

view the American minister presented his government's
position and questions.5 As expected, Palmerston
4'b'd
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5House Executive Document 75, 1st session of the
31st Congress., 108, 234, quoted in Travis, 93.
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denied any intentions on the part of his government to
obtain colonies or to make settlements in Central
America.

To a specific question concerning the British

occupation of San Juan del Norte (by that time re
named Grey Town) Palmerston answered that it was a
possession of the Mosquito Indians, although occupied
by the British, and that the British occupation would
soon end.

He emphasized the ownership of that port

by the Mosquitos and declined to recognize that the
Nicaraguan had any right to claim it.

Although Lord

Palmerston re-affirmed the British protectorate over
the Mosquito kingdom he maintained that the British
and American interests in Central America were the
same.

He also subscribed to Clayton's belief that

the entire world would benefit from the construction
of a trans-isthmian communication.6
While awaiting his interview with Lord Palmerston,
Bancroft attempted to follow another part of his in
structions concerning Costa Rica.

Costa Rica and

Nicaragua were in the midst of a boundary dispute
7
over the southern bank of the San Juan river, and
Clayton feared that Costa Rica's friendship for Great
6ibid.
7Pratt, 287.
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Britain might result in a land cession of that area to
Britain.

Bancroft was directed to obtain a promise

from the Costa Rican minister to London, Felipe Molina,
that Costa Rica would not yield to any "foreign
aggression''•

Molina promised Bancroft that Costa Rica

would stand firmly against such an aggression even
though he had asked for the British protection only
·--..-,. , five months earlier� 8
...,

The negotiations and interposition by the United
States in behalf of Nicaragua did not appear to be
making much progress for the latter nation by mid
summer, 1849.

At that time Nicar�guan Charg� d'

Affaires to London, Francisco Castellon, asked
Bancroft for the annexation of his country to the
United States.9 Bancroft replied that he was not
instructed on that subject and suggested that
Nicaragua attempt to settle her problems with Britain
and Costa Rica.

Castellon asked Lord Palmerston to

submit their differences to arbitration but Palmerston
rejected his proposal.
In the face of British opposition and Central
American confusion Bancroft made the decision to
8

Travis,

70-71.

9williams, 73e
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submit the written protest authorized by Clayton.
Bancroft noted that the only point of the discussions
that he and Lord Palmerston agreed upon was the desir
ability of the trans-isthmian communication.

Without

agreement on the question of sovereignty, however,
there could be no amicable settlement on the route.
Bancroft also noted the difficulty he had in obtaining
interviews with Lord Palmerston and correctly con
cluded that the British Foreign Minister did not want
to discuss the issue.10 Before he was able to complete
the protest and submit it to Lord Palmerston, Bancroft
was recalled by Secretary Clayton.
During the interval between the recall of Bancroft
and the appointment of a new minister to London, Secre
tary Clayton learned of the agreement concluded between
the Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company and the government of Nicaragua.11 That contract called for a seato-sea passage through Nicaragua that would have
violated British pretensions to the Mosquito territory,
including Grey Town.

Since the United States did not

recognize the sovereignty of the Mosquitos over that
territory Clayton was aware of the potential repercussions
with Great Britain.
lOThoma.s,

11.b'd
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Secretary Clayton was also painfully
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aware that Charge Squier had been instructed to do all
within his power to help the canal company secure that
contract and upon the success of that venture Squier was
also instructed to negotiate a treaty securing the rights
of transit to the citizens of the United States.

Al

though Anglo-American relations were not the most
cordial at that time, it was certain that Palmerston
would have been greatly offended if he had received word
of the contract and the treaty without a proper explan
ation from a representative of the United States govern
ment.

In order to deal with that eventuality Clayton

directed William C. Rives, the new United States Minister
to France, to stop in London on his way to his new
appoin
. t
. tmen t in
. Paris.
. 12 H'is purpose was to acquain
Lord Palmerston with the American position in reference
to the new incidents.
Rives was instructed to explain to the British
forei�n secretary that the United States viewed "the
title of the state Nicaragua, which entered into this
contract, as irrefragable," and that the United States
was about to make a treaty with her on the subject.13
If Palmerston made it clear to Rives that he planned
1210c. cit., 95.
1310c. cit., 94.
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to support the Mosquito protectorate then Rives was
to continue on his way to Paris and leave the business
of a formal protest to the newly appointed minister
to the St. James court, AbbottLawrence.
Although Rives had some difficulty in obtaining
an interview with Lord Palmerston, he was eventually
received cordially on September 24, 1849.

While

waiting for his interview Rives made a study of the
British position concerning Central America.

He soon

became convinced that Great Britain had become fully
involved with the Mosquito position.

He felt that the

British had followed a policy that was based on testing
her commercial rivals in Central America and taking
The British position,
.
. 14
. d on a piecemea 1 basis.
therefore, was attaine

everything that they allowed.

Upon meeting with Palmerston, Rives explained
that his purpose,was to relate the position of the
United States in the Central American conflict.

That

position was that the United States supported the
Nicaraguan territorial rights to the proposed canal
route.

Rives pointed out that the major reason for

American interest in any improved communications system
which would provide greater contact with the American
territories on the Pacific coast.
14Travis, 96.

Following his in-
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structions, Rives then inf6rmed Palmerston of the
obvious advantages to world commerce that a neutral
'

canal would afford.

At the same time, however, Rives

also pointed out the equally obvious disadvantages
of one great commercial power controlling the canal.
The control of Grey Town by British authorities in the
name of the Mosquitos would be looked upon with dis
satisfaction by the other commercial powers, according
to Rives.

The control of the eastern terminus of the

proposed canal by Britain raised the obvious allegation
that that country was attempting to secure exclusive
control of the isthmus.

Rives asked Lo�d Palmerston

to explain the British position concerning Grey Town,
the Mosquito protectorate and the proposed canal.15
In answer to Rives' question Palmerston stated
that although the Mosquitos were savages the British
government had recognized them as a sovereign govern
ment for more than a century.16 That sovereignty
(including their sovereignty over Grey Town) was based
on the fact that the Indians and their territories had
never been conquered by either the Spanish or the

15Thomas, 95.

16Travis,
.
97 •
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Central Americans.

Palmerston denied that Great

Britain held Grey Town in order to control the canal
route.

In fact, he agreed to join in the construction

of any canal as long as it would remain "a common
highway for the use and benefit of all nations.11 1 7
In conclusion, Rives suggested to Lord Palmerston that
Britain utilize her influence on Costa Rica and the
Mosquitos, while the United States do the same with
Nicaragua in order to bring about a canal project that
would benefit all nations.18 #hen he left, Hives was
certain that he had obtained satisfactory answers and
that the two nations had been drawn closer by the
discussion.

Rives felt the only reason the British

had secured the eastern terminus at Grey Town was to
prevent the United States from obtaining exclusive
canal rights.19
Shortly after Rives' departure for the continent,
AbbottLawrence arrived in London to fill Bancroft's
vacancy as Minister to Jreat Britain.

Lawrence was

presented to Lord Palmerston and the Prime Minister,
Lord John Russell.
17.b'd
l l •
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On October 19, Lawrence wrote to

1910c. cit., 80.
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Clayton echoing Rives hopes for agreement.20

Both

Russell and Palmerston had repeated the latter's
earlier attitudes concerning the future hope of the

trans-isthmian canal and Anglo-American co-operation.21
Lawrence's optimism received a minor set-back on

the basis of a letter written to him on the following
day by Secretary Clayton.22 On October 20, 1849,
Clayton wrote his complete instructions to Lawrence.
In that letter Clayton wrote that Britain had revealed
to him a determination to maintain the Mosquito pro
tectorate.

The maintenance of the Indian's sovereignty

over Grey Town and the adjoining lands stood as
obstacles to the development of any trans-isthmian
communication the United States had in mind.

Inasmuch

as the United States recognized Spain's earlier right
to the disputed territory and the inheritance by the
Central American,states of that same land, Clayton
explained that the United States could not tolerate
', the Mosquito claim.

In summation Clayton maintained

20state Department Archives, National Archives,
microcopy 30, roll 56. Lawrence to Clayton, Oct. 19,
1849. Cited hereafter as 11 S.D.A., microcopy . • • "
21.b.d
l l •
22s.D.A., microcopy 77, roll no.
Lawrence, October 20, 1849.
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that the United States would not allow the British
claims in behalf of the Mosquitos to stand in the way
of the trans-isthmian canal.

Again Clayton mentioned

the desirability of a free and undisputed route across
the isthmus, calling for British evacuation of
Nicaraguan territory.
In order to obtain a "healthy" atmosphere for
co-operation in Central America the American secretary
of state directed Lawrence to call for British evacu
ation of Central American territory "without prejudice
to any rights that British subjects might have acquired
under treaty stipulations between Great nritain and

Spain 11 • 23

Clayton also suggested that the United

States and Great Britain enter into a treaty guaran
teeing the independence of Nicaragua and Honduras and
the freedom of the proposed canal.

The problem of the

Mos quito Indian� was to be solved by giving them a
reservation to live on as long as that reservation did
not interfere with the canal route.

At that point

Clayton offered Great Uritain the good offices of the
United States in settling British differences with
Nicaragua.
As a final display of good faith, Clayton directed
23.b.d
l l •
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Lawrence to present the offer of a treaty between the
two nations.

That treaty or convention would bind

both nations "never to colonize, annex, settle, or
fortify any part of the ancient territory of Guatemala,
embracing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and indeed,
the whole Mosquito coast.11 24

If Great Britain rejected

those proposals Lawrence was instructed to inform
Palmerston of the tenor of the Hise treaty.

Clayton

tried to use the Hise treaty as a lever to force
Britain into an amicable agreement.

He directed

Lawrence to tell Lord Palmerston that the Hise treaty
would not be submitted to the senate if Great Britain
would join with the United States in guaranteeing the
freedom of the isthmian transit.

Clayton made it

clear to Lawrence that if Britain did not acquiesce
the Hise treaty or a similar treaty that Squier might
negotiate would be submitted to the senate in order
to secure the transit route.
Lawrence received Clayton's dispatch in early
November and immediately obtained an interview on
November 8, 1849 with Lord Palmerston in order to lay
his country's views before the foreign secretary.

In

presenting his case to Lord Palmerston, Lawrence
simplified his instructions by revealing the American
24.b.d
i i •
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desire to see Great Britain, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica
settle their differences.

The upshot of such a recon

ciliation could be relieved tensions between the
United States and Great Britain over Central America.
Such a situation would have presaged an amicable agree
ment between those two nations for the development of
a trans-isthmian communication.2 5
In order to obtain Palmerston's views in writing
Lawrence dispatched a note to the foreign secretary
immediately after the interview.

In that letter

Lawrence asked (1) whether Great Britain planned to
occupy, colonize, or settle any part of Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, the Mosquito coast, or any other part of
Central America, and (2) if Great Britain would join
the United States in guaranteeing the neutrality of
a ship canal.

Lawrence re-affirmed earlier statements

that the United States had no ulterior motives in
Central America and planned no colonization.26
On November 14 Lawrence wrote to Clayton that he
had received Palmerston's answer to his letter of
25The trend of the discussion between Palmerston
and Lawrence was relayed by the latter to Clayton via
a despatch on November 9, 1849a S.D.A., microcopy 30,
roll 56a
26s.D.A. ,
microcopy 30, roll 56. Lawrence to
Clayton, November 9, 1849, enclosure: Lawrence to
Palmerston, Nov. 8, 1849 •.
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November 9.2 7

Lawrence explained to Clayton that he

had not divulged to Palmerston the stipulations of the
Squier treaty because he felt that the atmosphere in
Britain was still conducive to an amicable agreement
and feared the Squier treaty would upset that atmosphere.
Palmerston had sent two separate notes, one dealing
with the Squier treaty and the other with Lawrence's
written queries of November 8, 1849.

The first note

explained that Palmerston was under the impression
that the Squier treaty called for the United States
to coerce Great Britain to give up Grey Town to
Nicaragua.28 If that were the case, wrote Palmerston,
it was an obvious aggression against British trust by
the United States.

He naturally demanded an explanation.

The second note from Lord Palmerston answered
Lawrence's inquiries by stating that Great Britain did
not intend to colonize, annex, or settle any part of
Central America.29 It asserted more specifically,
27s.D.A., microcopy 30, roll 56,
Clayton, November 14, 1849.
28s.D.A., microcopy 30, roll 56,
Clayton, November 14, 1849, enclosure
to Lawrence, November 13, 1849.
29s.D.A., microcopy 30, roll 56,
Clayton, November 14, 1849, enclosure
to Lawrence, November 13, 1849.
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Lawrence to
#1: Palmerston
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#2: Palmerston
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that Great Britain maintained no dominion over the
Mosquito territory.

He said Britain had been carrying

on close r elations with the Mosquito kingdom for two
centuries.

The foreign secretary went on to write

that Great Britain also desired to enter an agreement
with the United States in order to develop and protect
a trans-isthmian canal.

In fact, in order to better

attain that end Great Britain would use its' influence
/ with the Mosquitos to secure passage through their
territory (including Grey Town)�

Lord Palmerston

also agreed to serve with the United States in bringing
about a settlement between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
In seeking quick answers from Palmerston, Lawrence
managed to narrow the scope of the issue quite rapidly.
Lord Palmerston had made it quite clear that Great
Britain still recognized the Mosquito claim of sover
eignty to Grey Town and the alleged Mosquito Shore.
In a letter to Palmerston d ated December 14, 1849
Lawrence recapitulated the mutual goals which both
nations had agreed upon. 30

He wrote that both nations

wanted the waterway built because of the obvious
advantages; the canal would bring Britain closer to

30s.D.A., microcopy 30, roll 56, Lawrence to

Clayton, November 22, 1849, enclosure #1:
to Palmerston, November 22, 1849.

Lawrence

87
her eastern empire and the United States closer to
its' western territories.

He observed that both nations

had remarked upon the desirability of the construction
of such a canal and promised to enter agreements pledging
to protect it while under construction and after com
'

pletion.

Lawrence also pointed out that the United

·states had already been granted transit rights in
exchange for guaranteeing the neutrality of the isthmus,
although the treaty had not been ratified at that time.
After the above recapitulation Lawrence arrived at his
point of departure; in the face of all of those facts
the only impediment to a peaceful settlement was the
solution to the Mosquito problem.

He wrote that the

Hritish protectorate over the Mosquitos remained as
the only roadblock to the completion of a great service
to the world and mankind.

The establishment of a

reservation for the Indians and the relinquishment
of Grey Town and the adjoining territory to Nicaragua
were again proposed.
By that position Lawrence achieved nothing more
than a stalemate in London.

His adamant attitude on

the Mosquito protectorate proved to be the roadblock
to continued useful negotiations on the Central
American issue.

Although he continued to communicate

with Lord Palmerston on the subject of an isthmian
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canal his efforts were wasted.

Palmerston recognized

that to attempt to obtain a reversal of positions by
Lawrence on the Mosquito protectorate was futile because
Lawrence simply was not authorized to do so.

The

foreign minister knew that an agreement made by Lawrence
that gave up the Nicaraguan claim would have been
negated by Lawrence's superiors in Washington.

However,

at the time negotiations in London were reaching a
stalemate Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer was on his way to
Washington as a special British Minister to the United
States.

The talks he would have with Secretary of

State Clayton were to eventually break the stalemate.
Negotiations In Washington
Late in the summer of 1849 Elijah Hise returned
to the United States from Central America with his
Nicaraguan treaty.

The exclusive nature of that

treaty was bound to arouse British feelings, and it
did.

Not only were the Bri�ish aroused by the treaty

but the political opposition to the Taylor administration
was upset also.31 Inasmuch as the administration did
not possess a congressional majority the Hise treaty
appeared to be in for a bad time.

By accepting the

treaty, the Democratic majority could have forced the
31Travis, 98.
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Taylor administration into an open conflict with the
British, or, if the administration failed to press the
advantage provided by the treaty, the opposition major
ity could have claimed that the administration was

giving up what had been gained through .negotiation.32
Secretary Clayton decided to withhold the treaty
from the senate and the puQlic press.

If the public

had learned of the treaty stipulations, the Democratic
' ·,

opposition could have mobilized the ever present anti
.British feelings against the administration.

The

Secretary of State called John F, T. Crampton, British
Minister to the United States, to discuss the situation
existing between the two nations.

During the confi

dential discussion Clayton made it clear to Crampton
that Hise had negotiated a treaty objectionable to
Britain.33 Clayton also pointed out to Crampton the
domestic political predicament just described and
suggested that the two countries move cautiously in
order to avoid a conflict.

The purpose of the conference,

then, was to reveal to Palmerston, through Crampton,

that there was a danger of war between the two nations.34

32.b.d
l l •
33 10c. cit., 99.

3 410c. cit., 99-100.
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At that point Clayton res·olved to draw Great
Britain into an agreement for co-operation in the

development and protection of a cana1.35

He felt that

if Palmerston could be shown the United States was
sincere in its desire to develop a free and neutral
canal then he would eventually join in the trans
isthmian project.

Clayton thought that the British,

upon becoming convinced that the United States did not

want exclusive control of the proposed canal, would no

longer need the Mosquito protectorate and would abandon
it.
In a later interview between Crampton and Clayton
which took place on September 30, 1849 Clayton promised
to discard the Hise treaty and negotiate a new one with
Nicaragua that would be open to all nations.36 That
treaty would guarantee protection to any company
assuming the responsibility of the canal project and
also provide no exclusive advantages to any nation.
In exchange for the dropping of the Hise treaty
Clayton hoped to gain British co-operation in the
construction of the canal and e;uarantees of its
neutrality.
35ibid.

36.b.d
l. l. •

',.
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Early in October, the canal contract negotiated
'-�. between Nicaragua and the Atlantic and Pacific Canal
Company as well as the Squier treaty arrived in Wash
ington.

Clayton immediately joined with Crampton in

discussions over the provisions of Squier's treaty.37
Although the treaty contained some objectionable
provisions, it was considerably more desirable than
the Hise treaty.

The British minister objected to the

fact that Nicaragua had ceded the route of the San
Juan river, including the port of Grey Town, claiming
that the territory ceded was Mosquito territory.38
Clayton announced to the British minister that the
United States planned to withhold the Hise and Squier
treaties from the senate while the British government
made its' decision concerning the co-operation of
Britain and the United States in building a canal.
However, the major stipulation for which Clayton was
holding out was an agreement between Great Britain
and the United States renouncing all claims to territory
in Central America.
37.b'd
1 1 •

If Great Britain decided against

38Palmerston would later protest to Lawrence in
London that the Squier treaty called for the United
States to deliver up Grey Town from British hands.
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such steps Clayton promised Crampton he would submit
one of the treaties to the senate.

Inasmuch as public

pressure was in favor of forcing Great Britain out of
Central America the ratification of a treaty would
have been an easy matter.

Unless Great Britain accept

ed Clayton's proposals her situation would have become
untenable and ratification of either treaty by the
United States would have been tantamount to a declara
tion of war.39

Looking at Clayton's policy in retrospect it is
possible to determine the basis for the involvement
between the United States and Great Britain.

Purely

and simply, the United States wanted to develop a
trans-isthmian canal�

Without delving into a number

of detailed explanations the United States government
felt that a canal was necessary in order for it to
properly maintain its' western territories.

In order

to obtain that end the United States found it necessary
to negotiate with the nations possessing routes feasible
for such a canal.

·,

Great Britain had developed a great distrust of
, American motives and actions in the Americas.

The

Monroe Doctrine and later policies of the United States

were calculated to thwart European programs of coloni3910c. cit., 101.
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zation and control of the new world.

These policies

certainly did not ingratiate the United States in the
eyes of Europe nor did they bring a bout any serious
rupture in relations between the "old world" and the
"new" until the one being discussed.
1

The growth in

popularity of the "manifest destiny" of the United
States in the 1840's, however, had begun to instill
a degree of distrust in Hritain.

The Hritish began

to have grave doubts about the wisdom of allowing
4
the United States to obtain its' every desire. 0
Since the United States expressed a need for a trans
isthmian canal the British immediately feared for
their positions in Central America and, more important,
in Asia.

These premonitions were based on the fear

that the United States desired the exclusive control
of the canal which, of course, would have threatened
British position.
The British reaction to that fear seemed to be
an attempt by the British agents in Central America
to secure all the isthmian routes against American
exploitation.

In short, the action taken by the

40A clear example of Great Britain's determination
to contain the United States was manifested in the
policy of George Canning alluded to earlier in the text
of this investigation. see Williams, 27.
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British to prevent the Americans from obtaining ex

clusive control of a canal seemed to the Americans a

British mov e to obtain exclusive control of the route.
The agents of both nations dedicated themselves to
defeating the "greedy motives" of the other which
accomplished nothing, save the complication of the
true goals of the two powers.41
As has been noted e arlier, Clayton sought agree
ment on three basic points:

(1) the joint guarantee

of neutrality of the canal route; (2) co-operative
efforts between the two nations in the protection and
development of the proposed canal; and (3) the mutual
denial of plans for territorial aggrandizement in
Central America.

Lord Palmerston agreed to the

desirability of all those goals; however, the third
point proved to be difficult to resolve mutually.

On

this point Lord Palmerston wrote that Great Britain
desired no territory in Central America and that the
British occupation of Grey Town was only for the
Mosquito king.42 In the same letter Palmerston offered
41An excellent account of the competition between
men such as Chatfield and Squier for the gain of the
countries they represented can be found in Williams,
26-66.
42s.D.A., microcopy 30, roll 56, Lawrence to
Clayton, November 14, 1849, enclosure #2: Palmerston
to Lawrence, November 13, 1849.
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to use British influence on the Mosquito king in order
to secure the canal route for the proposed international
waterway.
Palmerston's attitude toward the Mosquito pro
tectorate and the steps taken by some of the British
agents in Central America continued to arouse American
distrust,

Secretary Clayton's attempts to bring about

a peaceful settlement appeared doomed until the arrival
in Washington of Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, the special
British Minister to the United States the British

government had decided to acquiesce in favor of all
of the American demands, except the abandonment of the
Mosquito protectorate.43 Bulwer correctly analyzed
the American goal to be, primarily, the establishment
of the canal.

The demand for the abandonment of the

Mosquito protectorate existed because it seemed to
the Americans to stand in the way of development of
the canal.

In a move designed to suppress the

Mosquito issue, Bulwer decided to emphasize the need
for an agreement on the development of an interoceanic
canal.

The negotiation of a convention between the two
nations avoided any direct mention of abandonment of
the Mosquito protectorate.
43williams, 89.

Although Bulwer succeeded
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in avoiding any discussion of the protectorate,
Secretary of State Clayton managed to word Article one
of the_proposed convention in such a manner that it
could be construed as meaning a British abandonment
of the Indians.

By February 3, 1850 the preliminary

convention was completed and sent to England for
Lord Palmerston's approval.

During the period the

convention was under consideration in London, public
_/�pinion against Great Britain was further aroused by
the Tigre island siezure and the subsequent reper
cussions that incident created.

In a letter to Abbott

Lawrence dated February 13, 1850, Lord Palmerston

disavowed the action of Chatfield as unwarranted.44

.....-�. However,

in the same letter, Lord Palmerston informed

Lawrence that the government of Honduras had become
greatly indebted to Great Britain.

Palmerston also

maintained the many British citizens had been wronged
in Honduras, and that, although he'disavowed Chatfield's
act, "Her Majesty's Government must not on that account
be considered as giving up in any degree the claims
which it has made on the Government of Honduras, and
must hold itself free to use whatever means the Law of
44s.D.A., microcopy 30, roll 56, Lawrence to
Clayton, February 14, 1850, enclosure#2: Palmerston to
Lawrence, February 13, 1850.
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Nations may allow for obtaining redress which it de
mands if that redress should continue to be withheld.11 4 5
Palmerston's disavowal must have been re-assuring to
Clayton, but the statement that Britain sought redress
from Honduras for the debts and actions seemed to be
contradictory to the spirit of a sincere disavowal of
Chatfield's actions.
On March 14, 1850 Secretary Clayton submitted the
Squier treaty to the senate for its' advice and consent.
Clayton's move seemed justified in the light of the
apparent duplicity of the �ritish statements.

Then,

on March 27, Bulwer addressed a note to Clayton in
forming him that Lord Palmerston had sent his approval
for the proposed convent.ion. 46 Along with that approval,
Palmerston re-affirmed his earlier statement that
Great Britain sought no territorial gain under the
guise of the Mosquito protectorate.47 With that re
assurance, it became possible to enter into the con
vention with Great Britain.
One incident threatened the safety of the treaty

/

45.b.d
1 1 •

46 S.D.A., microcopy 50, roll T-2 , Hulwer to
7
Clayton, March 27, 1850.
47Palmerston's earlier statement .referred to is
his letter to Lawrence of November 13, 1849.
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just prior to its' signing and transmission to the
senate.

On April 15, 1850 Bulwer sent a note to Clayton

demanding the restraint of any American attempts to
settle on Her Majesty's possession, Ruatan.

Great

Britain had secured Ruatan and the remaining Bay isiands
in 1841 and had maintained possession of the islands
until that date.

Clayton asked Bulwer to withdraw

his note because it would imperil the acceptance of
the treaty they had just negotiated.

Clayton feared

that the British would appear to be making new terri
torial claims in Central America.

The American secre

tary of state assured Bulwer that the United States
had no designs on the Bay islands.
Bulwer withdrew the note.

With that assurance

After clearing the last

roadblock, Clayton and Bulwer signed the treaty on
April 19, 1850.

The convention was submitted to the

United States Senate on April 22, 1850.
In an effort to assure rapid ratification of his
treaty, Clayton conferred with congressional leaders
prior to the treaty's transmission to the senate.48
William R. King, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, helped Clayton secure the approval
of the treaty even in the face of a Democratic major
ity.

An element of the senate was eager to defeat the
48Miller, Vol. V, 68.
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treaty because it did not call for the removal of the
British from Central America.

In the lobbying that

took place, Clayton and Senator King were able to
convince enough senators that the treaty was an en
forcement of the Monroe Doctrine in that it did call
·
for the abandonment of the Mosquito territory.49 The
first article of the treaty, it was explained,was left

purposely vague in order to protect British pride.50
Because of the advance preparations made by

Senator King and Secretary Clayton the treaty received
very little debate on the floor of the senate.

On

May 23 the convention was ratified by the United States
Senate.
Five days prior to the exchange of ratifications
Bulwer sent a note to Secretary Clayton that consisted
of a declaration concerning an interpretation of the
convention about to be concluded.

That declaration was

to have served as a qualification to the treaty and
read as follows:
Declaration
In proceeding to the exchange of the Ratifi
cations of the Convention signed at Washington on
the 19th of April 1850 between Her Britannick
(sic) Majesty and the United States of America,
49Williams, 98-99.
5oibid.
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relative to the establishment of a communication
by ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, The undersigned, Her Britannick Csic]
Majesty's Plenipotentiary, has received Her
Majesty's instructions to declare, that Her
Majesty does not understand the engagements of
that Convention to apply to Her Majesty's
settlement at Honduras or to its Dependencies.
Her Majesty's Ratification 0£ the said
convention is exchanged under the.explicit Dec
laration abovementioned.
Done at Washington the 29th day of June,
1850.
H. L. Bulwer 51
On July 4, 1850 Secretary Clayton addressed a note
to Senator King informing him of a counter-declaration
that he planned to present to Bulwer prior to the
exchange of ratifications. 52 Clayton's note asked the
senator if he (Clayton) could explain to Bulwer that
the senate understood that British Honduras was not
meant to be included in the convention.
answered in the affirmative.53

The senator

Later that same day Secretary of State Clayton and
the British Minister, Bulwer, exchanged ratifications

--

of th� treaty.
.

Prior to exchanging the ratifications,

however, Clayton handed to Bulwer a counter-declaration,

/

51s.D.A., microcopy 50, roll T-27� Bulwer to
Clayton, June 29, 1850.
52Miller, Vol. V, 68 .
3
53
10c. cit., 684.
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in answer to Bulwer's declaration of June 29th.54
That counter-declaration stated that the United States
did not mean to include British Honduras in the terri
tory covered by the treaty stipulations.

In writing

of the territory Clayton wrote that the "title to them
it is now and has been

my

intention throughout the

whole negotiation, to leave, as the treaty leaves it,
without denying, affirming, or in any way meddling
with the same, just as it stood previously".55

Both

men were satisfied that the treaty had accomplished
the ends of their respective nations.

5410c. cit., 682-683.
55ibid.

VI.

CONCLUSION

S�ry of the Decade of Difficulty, 1850-60
Relations between Great Hritain and the United
States were not immediately pacified upon the ratifi
cation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

In the first

place, in order to begin the co-operative efforts which
//

/were called for by the treaty, it was a necessary prerequisite to have an atmosph�re of cordiality and
mutual trust.

That condition was totally lacking

throughout the decade 1850-60.

It must also be

remembered that President Zachary Taylor died on
July 9, 1850, just five days after the exchange of
·--...,,._ the Clayton-Bulwer ratifications.

The dismissal of

Clayton and the appointment of Daniel Webster to the
post of the secretary of state by the new President,

Millard Fillmore, destroyed any possibility of Clayton
implementing a policy in support of his convention.
Although the Fillmore administration did not
display great enthusiasm for obtaining a final settle
ment of the Central American question, other reasons

contributed greatly to the unsettled state of affairs.1

On the Central American scene Costa Rica and Nicaragua
1Williams, 323.
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were very nearly at war with each other over boundary
disputes.2 Great Britain could not reach an acceptable
agreement with Nicaragua over the Mosquito and Grey
Town questions.

Inasmuch as the british were consider

ed as allies of Costa Rica and the Mosquitos, their
position dictated that they be opposed to Nicaragua.
That position naturally placed them in opposition to
the United States.

This aligned the signatories of

the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in the same state of antag
onism as they were in prior to the treatyt 3
In spite of the stalemate that followed the treaty
signing relations remained peaceful for two years.
That peace, however, was broken
on March 20, 1852
<
when, by royal p�oclamation, Great britain made the
Bay islands an English colony.

The British move

-proved to be a most tactless one in that it aroused
those who had opposed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in the
United States against what was regarded as a "new"
British agression.

The opponents of the treaty con

sisted mainly of Democrats, led by Senator Lewis Cass
of Michigan.

In order to make political capital of the

situation, Senator Cass claimed that Clayton and the
2Travis, 129.
3·b'd
1. 1. •
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Whigs had acquiesced in the face of the British declar
ation presented by Hulwer on the 29th of June, 1850.4
Cass further stated that the Monroe Doctrine had been
sacrificed to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by Clayton's
alleged recognition of the British col.ony of Honduras
and the Bay islands as a dependency.
had been elected to the senate.

Meanwhile, Clayton

The defense that

Clayton used was that he, Clayton, had observed in
his memorandum, dated July 5, 1850, and in his counter
declaration to Bulwer that the declaration made by a
British representative had no legal bearing on the
treaty itself.

He repeated his position that no

matter what the declaration or counter-declaration
said they had no legal bearing on the treaty because
the stipulations of those remarks had not been ratified
by the senate.5
The United States declared that the areas claimed
by Great Britain should be abandoned under the pro
visions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

The British,

however, asserted that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty only
condemned future territorial acquisitions.

The en

suing deadlock of one year's duration did nothing more
than create antagonism between the two nations and
4

loc. cit., 144.
5·b·d
1 1 •
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provide opportunities for American politicians to
make capital of the situation by demanding a "strict
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine 11 • 6 During that
time the United States officially maintained its' own
interpretation of the treaty as valid and called for
British co-operation.
By the year 1854 it became apparent to the British
ministry that the United States would not give ground
in the conflict.

The ministry feared that the Demo

cratic administration of President Franklin Pierce was
using British involvement in the Crimean War to further
its' ambitions of territorial aggrandizement.7 In fact,
the British ministry thought most of Pierce's actions
were motivated by an alliance of some sort between
Russia and the United States.

The British also felt

that Pierce administration had used the conflict with
Britain as mean�of re-gaining political prestige lost
by its' inability to acquire Cuba and Santo Domingo,

�.and to drive British influence from Central America.8
The final factor considered by Lord Clarendon, the
new British foreign secretary, was the possibility of
war with the United States.

The possibility of that

6Richard W. VanAlstyne, "British Diplomacy and the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60," Journal of Modern
History, XI, 172.
710c. cit., 171.
810c.

. t•

CJ.

'

172.
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eventuality was not welcomed because of the attitude
of the British public; it was definitely not in favor
of a war with the United States.
A note from James Buchanan, United States Minister

to London, to Lord Clarendon dated January 6, 1854
reprimanded the British because of their position in
Central America.9 That note particularly discussed
the recent British position on Belize and the Bay
islands.

Buchanan's upbraiding of the British brought

into focus the thoughts concerning American motives
just discussed and were partly responsible for a
change in British attitude.

The British ministry

began to adopt a new policy concerning Central America
and Lord Clarendon professed a desire to reach an
accord in a note to Buchanan, dated May 2, 1854.10
The ministry was beginning to recognize the weakness
of its' position in Central America and was willing
to make great concessions to the United States.
haps the Crimean War was a factor, too.

Per

At any rate,

Lord Clarendon promised to give up the Mosquito pro
tectorate, return the Bay islands to Honduras, and to
set definite boundaries for Belize.

'

--

910c. cit., 169.
10loc. cit., 175-176.
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107
if the Anglo-American conflict was about to be resolved

but the news of the Grey Town bombardment by Captain
George N. Hollins of the United States Navy forced
Clarendon to immediately withdraw the conciliatory
offer of May 2, 1854.11

Through the year 1855 the situation worsened be
tween the two nations.

A low in relations was reached

in 1856 when the "recruiting charges" against John F. T.
Crampton, Minister to the United States, finally brought
about his expulsion on May 28, 1856.12 By the time of
Crampton's expulsion the possibility of war between
Great Britain and the United States was being openly
debated.in both nations.13 At that time British states
men were being subjected to a good deal of criticism

because of their traditional Central American policy.14

The attacks against the ministry in the press and the
Parliament appeared to bring about a change in attitude
ll.

l b.l d •

12nuring the Crimean War heavy casualties forced
the British to resort to foreign enlistments. Crampton
was accused of violating American neutrality laws by
"luring" recruits to Nova Scotia where. they were en
listed in the British armed forces.
13williams, 24.
3
14Kenneth Bourne, "The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and
the Decline of British Opposition to the Territorial
Expansion of the United States, 1857-60." Journal of
Modern History, XXXIII, 287.
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in those traditional British policies in Central
America.

The foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon,

realized that Great Britain could ill afford a war with
the United States because of the obvious damage to

/

commercial relations and because the British people

/ would not have supported such a war.15·

Lord Clarendon took advantage of the situation to
enter into negotiations with George M. Dallas, Buchanan's
successor as United States Minister to. London, in order
to arrange a new agreement between the two governments.
The Dallas-Clarendon convention would have replaced the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty with several British concessions
to the American demands.16 Among other things, the
British promised to define the Belize boundaries, set
up the Bay islands as "free territory" under Honduras,
and recognize Nicaragua as possessing sovereignty over
the Mosquito territory.(if Nicaragua would compensate
the Mosquitos).

The senate ratified the agreement

after making one amendment; the senate demanded that
Honduras be given complete sovereignty over the Bay

Great Britain rejected that amendment producing
another stalemate.17

islands.

15williams, 325.

16 loc. cit., 32 .
7

1710c. cit., 231.
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The deadlock between the two nations produced a
good deal of animosity within the United States.

There

were strong si(9ls that Congress might unilaterally
abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty because it seemed
"··,�. to place limits only on the United States.

Lord Francis

Napier, Crampton's successor in Washington, advised
Secretary of State Lewis Cass that Great Britain was
prepared to negotiate directly with the Central American
nations in order to alleviate the differences between
Britain, Central America and the United States.18 The
British minister said that Britain wished to carry out
its' settlements in the spirit of the American inter
pretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

Pierce's suc

cessor, President Buchanan, however, was not in favor
of the British plan and encouraged continued efforts
for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
Near the end of 1857 Lord Clarendon had come to
the conclusion that Great Britain ought to agree with
the United States to abrogate the treaty, return to the
"status quo 11 in Central America, and negotiate a simple
canal agreement with the United States.19 The only
apparent alternative was to grant the American demands
18.b.d
l l •
19Bourne, 288.
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in Central America which would cost a good deal of
British pride.

Lord Napier was instructed by Lord

Clarendon to announce to the American government that
Britain was willing to abrogate the treaty.

The

abrogation would have at least done away with the
American contention that Britain would have to give
up her Central American position.20
The new British position appeared to have convinced
the United States government that the nation's best
interests would be served 9y retaining the Clayton
Bulwer treaty.2L, Buchanan rejected the abrogation
proposal although congressional leaders continued to
discuss it.

At that stage of affairs, Lord Napier

managed to convince his superiors in London that it
would serve Britain's best interests also to retain
the treaty.22 Napier pointed out that although
American colonization of the isthmus was inevitable,
annexation was not if the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were
retained in effect.

He wrote:

The English Race whether by direct movement
from the Mother Country or by transmission through
2010c. cit., 289.
21Williams, 326.

22van Alstyne, "British Diplomacy and the Clayton
Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60". 180.
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/

the United States will undoubtedly spread to the
Central American Region, but under the provisions
of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which can now be
preserved by concessions insignificant if we turn
from the past, and look to the future, that region
can never be annexed or associated to the North
American Confederation, but will maintain a sep
arate and neutral position so desirable if we
regard the avenues which traverse it and untie
the Oceans.23

Napier carried his argument further when he pointed
out that American annexation of the isthmus certainly
would not lead to equal transit rights for Britain.
Finally, Napier contended that a return to the "status
...._

quo" would inevitably lead to war between the United

'·States and Great Britain.
Upon learning that Great Britain was unfavorably
disposed toward the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty President Buchanan re-opened discussions with
4
Napier.2
Cordiality became the keynote of the discussions when it was learned that Britain had decided
that she must divest herself of her Central American
possessions (with the exception of Belize) in order to
maintain the spirit of the treaty.

Charles L. Wyke was

appointed by the British government to proceed
to Central America and negotiate settlements with
23Napier to Clarendon, No. 90� June 7, 1857, .B'.O.
5/672 quoted in Van Alstyne, ibid.
24Williams, 27.
3
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Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica.25

\

He soon came

to an agreement�ith Nicaragua to recognize that nation's
sovereignty over the Mosquito Shore and Grey Town.26
.Wyke negotiated a settlement with Honduras which returned the Bay islands to that nation and settled the

boundary dispute between British Honduras and Honduras.27
Costa Rica and Nicaragua finally agreed to recognize
the southern bank of the San Juan river as the border
between those two nations.28 The settlement arrived
at proved to be entirely satisfactory to President
Buchanan and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty finally, in
1860, became a respected document in the United States.
Summary
In any discussion of a treaty it becomes necessary
to ascertain first, the object of the treaty and second,
whether that object was attained.

From the American

point of view it must be stated that two ends were de
sired.

The primary goal was to secure the use of a trans

isthmian canal in order to develop a better system of
25Travis, 196.
261OC. Cl·t . , 198.

27.b.d
l l •
28
· .h'
l.J.!l d •
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communications between the eastern and western sections
of the United States.

In order to remain within the

bounds of diplomatic precedent the United States could
not negotiate and ratify treaties with Central American
nations which would grant exclusiv:e rights of t:ransit
in exchange for American guarantees of the sovereignty
to those Central American states.

Another factor that

stopped the United States from doing so was the presence
of Great Britain in the isthmus region.

Jealousy of

Britain caused the United States to abstain from any
acts of aggrandizement in �entral America in order to
obtain the desired canal.

Since exclusive transit rights

were out of the question, a co-operative project was
the only apparent solution.
A secondary reason for negotiating the treaty be
tween the United States and Great Britain was to satisfy
those Americans who believed in the "manifest destiny"
of the United States to lead the two Americas in
democracy.

The Monroe Doctrine became the rallying

point for those who strongly supported that clause of
the doctrine that called for non-colonization by
Europeans and opposed the imposition of European polit
ical systems in the Americas.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty

appeared to promote this aim.
Secretary of State John M. Clayton was fully aware
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of both of the abovementioned reasons for securing
an a@:'eement.

However, he also felt that a trans

isthmian canal was of paramount importance.

In the

process of negotiating for the canal Clayton hoped to
allay the fears of both Americans and Englishmen by
eliminating the possibility of either nation obtaining
exclusive control of an isthmian canal.

The agressions

and intrigues of both nations were calculated to thwart
the other's plans for exclusive canal rights.

If Clayton

eliminated British attempts to thwart American plans,
there would be no further need for a ggressions on
either side.
British policy, from the days of George Canning,

had been to assume leadership in Latin America. 29
That policy was obviously in contradiction to the

Monroe Doctrine but then, the United States' policy
happened to contradict British policy.

Lord Palmerston

certainly did not deviate from the "Canning school"
when he secu
· red the Mosquito protectorate as a pre
caution against exclusive American control of the
most obvious canal route.
When Palmerston agreed to the Clayton-Bulwer

29 For an explanation of Cannin�•s policy see

chapter II, subchapter "The Monroe Doctrine".
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convention he visualized the United States and Great
Britain co-operating in the development and protection
of a neutral canal.

He did not anticipate withdrawal

from the Mosquito protectorate because it would have
been a severe setback to British prestige to appear
to have been forced from her position.

Nor did

Palmerston expect to be forced to withdraw from Belize
or the Bay islands.

Belize was made up of an almost

entirely English population while the Bay islands
were claimed to be a dependency of Belize.
The next, and perhaps most important, question to
be answered is whether or not the treaty resolved the
issued at hand?

Inasmuch as article one of the treaty

states,
The governments of the United States and �reat
Britain hereby declare, that neither the one nor
the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself
any exclusive control over the said Ship Canal
. . . 30
it becomes apparent that the secretary of state had
secured the agreement of Great Britain not to seek an
exclusive transit through Central America.

The greatest

fear of Americans was that Britain would be allowed to
obtain such an exclusive control of the isthmus, thereby
depriving the United States of it's cherished goal.
Obviously the Clayton-Bulwer treaty guarded against that
30Article I, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, April 19, 1850.
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contingencyi
The opening sentence in Article one continues:
agreeing, that neither will ever erect or maintain
any fortifications commanding the same, or in the
vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or· colo
nize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mog�uito Coast, or any
part of Central America • • •
That phrase clearly stipulated against exercising
dominion over Central America, denying Great Britain
the right to exercise control over the Mosquitos.
After the ratification of the treaty, as has been
mentioned above, the Democrats frequently attacked it,
usually on the ground that it violated the Monroe
Their contention was that the treaty acquiesced

Doctrine.

to British claims of rights to "Belize and its' de
pendencies".
facts.

Such a claim is not supported by the

Secretary Clayton and Senator King both asserted

in their correspondence, as did Clayton in his memo
randum and counter-declaration to Crampton, that
Crampton's delcaration asserting Britain's right to
"Belize and its dependencies" did not affect the treaty
in any way.

Any change in the treaty, in order to

become effective would have had to be ratified by the
senate�

If Clayton had wanted to officially accept

the British declaration as part of the treaty, he
l l •
31.b.d
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would have had to re-submit the treaty and declaration
to the senate for ratification.
Secretary Clayton and Senator King did recognize
the British rights in Belize as granted by the Anglo
Spanish treaties of 1783 and 1786.

The British claims

to Belize, in fact, were very substantial inasmuch as
their grant to rights in the area go as far back as
1670 and were granted to the British in an Anglo
Spanish treaty of that year.

Another factor in favor

of the British was that the Belize settlement was
mainly made up of Englishmen.

Britain's claims to the

Bay islands as dependencies of Belize, however, were
based on rather dubious grounds.

The islands were over

one hundred miles from Belize but just a few miles from
the Honduran shore.

Honduras strongly contested British

control of the islands.
The main difficulty barring agreement, however,
was the Mosquito protectorate.

Clayton assumed that

the British maintained the Mosquito protectorate in
order to block the path of the United States in any
attempt to obtain exclusive control of an isthmian
transit route.

With the negotiation of a co-operative

agreement for the development of a canal, Clayton
thought the .british should abandon the Mosquito
protectorate because there was no longer a threat of

'"

the United States obtaining exclusive canal rights.

-----
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When Great Britain announced the establishment of
a nritish colony in the Bay islands in 1852 it appeared
as if Great Britain would not live up to the treaty •.
Furthermore, the Mosquito protectorate was still in
existence at thal time and its' presence complicated
an already complex situation.

At that point the

nemocratic politicians and press began to give the
treaty a difficult time by "pointing out" that it
violated the Monroe Doctrine.

The decade 1850-60 was

an unstable period in American politics and politicians
were struggling to find a political "whipping boy"
in order to enhance their image in the esteem of the
voting public.

An attack upon a document that was

claimed to violate sacred traditions of America was
thought to be a telling defense of American heritage.
The contemporary attacks upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
were ill-founded, mis-directed, and clearly politically
motivated.
Nho scored a diplomatic victory in the Clayton
Bulwer treaty?

Many historians have maintained that

the British appear to have scored a triumph over
American diplomacy.32 None state that victory more
strongly than Richard

w.

van Alstyne.

In an article

written for the Journal of Modern History Van Alstyne
32A notable example is Richard W. VanAlstyne,
"British Deplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 185060". Julius W. Pratt's A History of United States
Foreign Policy also holds that position. (289)
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quite strongly states his case,
Beyond question, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty became
a master-instrument of british diplomacy. It was
the best insurance for peace in the western hemi
sphere that Great britain could possiDly have had.
For it she sacrificed not one material interest,
and she paid a price which was cheap in her own
estimation to keep it.33
He later wrote in the same article,
the United States could hardly be said to have
been a satisfied partner at any time during the
life of the'Cl� ton-Bulwer treaty. It cabined
our ambitions.3

4

, The fact that the treaty secured peace between Great
Britain and the United States can hardly be interpreted
as a British diplomatic "coup" because it must be
remembered that Secretary Clayton also desired a
peacable settlement of the matter.

The statement that

the Clayton-Bulwer treaty "cabined our ambitions" is
open to question.

It was the opposition of the anti

slavery element which actually doomed further American
expansion southward.

Van Alstyne claims the American

drive to pe�etrate Central America was stopped by the

Civil War,35 it must be remembered that the United

States had already relinquished its greatest possible
33van Alstyne, loc. cit., 182-183.
l l •
34.b.d

35.b.d
l l •
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opportunity to grab more territory after the defeat of
Mexico.

The growing power of the anti-slavery forces

and the relative decline of southern political influence
in the later 1850's brought to an end any chance of
territorial aggrandizement in Central America.
There are sound reasons for concluding that the
United States gained more than Britain from the Clayton
Bulwer treaty.

In the first place, Secretary Clayton

secured the agreement of Great Britain to co-operate
in the development of a project
of prime interest to
'
the United Stat�s; the canal that could link

the

American western territories to the rest of the nation.
The Treaty, by making a canal possible, strengthened
the American position in the western hemisphere
politically and commercially.

The obvious future

advantage to American commerce in Asia is another reason
to consider the treaty an American diplomatic victory.
However, the greatest triumph for the United
States in the treaty was the assertion, for the first
time in the arena of international relations,of the
Monroe Doctrine.

Although James Monroe announced that

doctrine in 1823, its' spirit had never been manifested
so forcefully as in the negotiation of the Clayton
Bulwer treaty.

Through that treaty, John M. Clayton

eliminated the future possibility of british colonization
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in Central America.

The British position was eventually

destroyed in the Bay islands and the Mosquito protec
torate by the American enforcement and interpretation
of the treaty throughout the decade.

Because of the

history of British rights in Belize that possession was
retained, but no future establishments.were made.
Past interpretations of the history of Anglo
American isthmian relations including the Clayton
Bulwer treaty quite uniformly regarded that treaty as
virtually a capitulation to British foreign policy.
To this writer, it appears to have been victory over
that policy.

The treaty violated the old containment

policy of George Canning and in the end brought a
reversal of that policy.

Since Canning and his successors

had sought to eliminate American influence and make
British policy dominant in Latin America the treaty
appears to have been a reversal for the British ministry.
American territorial ambitions (what there were left)
may have been thwarted but, Britain's ambitions were
encumbered by the treaty also.

At the very least, the

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a British recognition of
American partnership in the western hemisphere.

APPENDIX
Treaty between Great Britain and Spain
Signed at Madrid, the 8th Day of July, 1670

tlb

I.

First, it is agreed between t�e above-mentioned

Plenipotentiaries, Sir William Godolphin and the Earl
of Penaranda, in the names of the Most Serene Kings
respectively, their Masters, that the Articles of peace
and alliance made between the Crowns of Great Britain
and Spain, in Madrid, on the W- of May, 1667, or any
clause thereof, shall in no manner be deemed or under
stood to be taken away or abrogated by this present
Treaty; but that the same shall remain perpetually in
their ancient force, stability, and vigor, so far forth
as they are not contrary or repugnant to this present
Convention and Articles, or to anything therein con
tained.
II.

That there be an universal peace, true and

sincere amity, in America, as in the other parts of the
world, jetween the Most Serene Kings of Great Britain
and Spain, their heirs and successors, and between the
Kingdoms, States, plantations, colonies, forts, cities,
islands, and dominions, without any distinction of place
belonging unto either of them, and between the people
and inhabitants under their respective obedience, which
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shall endure from this day for ever, and be observed
inviolably, as well by land as by sea and fresh waters,
so as to promote each the welfare and advantage of the
other and favour and assist one another with mutual
love; and that every where, as well in those remote
countries as in these which are nearer; the faithful
offices of good neighbourh9od and friendship may be
exercised and ine-reased between them.
VII.

All offences, damages, losses, injuries,

which the nations and people of Great Britain and Spain
have at any time heretofore, upon what cause or pre
text soever, suffered by each other in America, shall
be expunged out of remembrance, and buried in oblivion,
as if no such thin� had ever past.
Moreover, it is agreed, that the Most Serene King
of Great Britain, His heirs and successors, shall have,
hold, keep, and enjoy for ever, with plenary right of
sovereignty, dominion, possession, and propriety, all
those lands, regions, islands, colonies, and places
whatsoever, being or situated in the West Indies, or
in any part of America, which the said King of Great
Britain and His subjects do at present hold and possess,
so as that in regard thereof, or upon any colour or
pretence whatsoever, nothing more may or ought to be
urged, nor any question or controversy be ever moved
concerning the same hereafter.
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VIII.

The subjects and inhabitants, merchants,

captains, masters of ships, mariners of the Kingdoms,
Provinces, and Dominions of each Confederate respectively,
shall abstain and forbear to sail and trade in the ports
and havens which have fortifications, castles, magazines,
or warehouses; and in all other places whatsoever possessed
by the other Party in the West Indies; to wit, the sub
jects of the King of Great Britain shall not sail unto,
and trade in the havens and places which the Catholic

·-

King holdeth in the said Indies; nor in like manner shall
the subjects of the King of Spain sail unto, or trade
in those places which are possessed there by the King
of Great Britain.
IX.

/

But if, at any time hereafter, either King

shall think fit to grant unto the subjects of the other,
any general or particular licence or privileges of
navigating unto, and trading in any places under His
obedience who shall grant the same, the said navigation
and trade shall be exercised and maintained according
to the form, tenor, and effect of the said permissions
or privileges to be allowed and given; for the security,
warrant, and suthority whereof, this present Treaty and
the ratification thereof shall serve.
X.

It is also agreed, that in case the subjects

and inhabitants of either of the Confederates with
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their shipping (whether public and of war, or private
and of merchants) be forced at any time through stress
of weather, pursuit of pirates and enemies, or other
inconvenience whatsoever, for the seeking of shelter
and harbour, tomtreat and enter into -any of the
rivers, creeks, bays, havens, roads, shores, and
ports belonging to the other in America, they shall
be received and treated there with all humanity and
kindness, and enjoy all friendly protection and help,
and it shall be lawful for them to refresh and provide
themselves, at reasonable and the usual rates, with
victuals and all things needful, either for the
sustenance of their persons, or reparation of their
ships, and conveniency of their voyage; and they shall
in no manner be detained or hindered from returning
out of ·tne said ports or roads, but shall remove and
depart, when and whither they please, without any let
or impediment.
XI.

Likewise, if any ships belonging to either

Confederate, their prople and subjects, shall, within

/

the coasts or Dominions of the other, stick upon the
sands, or be wrecked (which .God forbid), or suffer any
damage,. the persons shipwrecked and cast on the shore
shall in no sort be kept prisoners, but,on the con
trary, all friendly assistance and relief shall be

·,.-,...

administered to their distress, and letters of safe
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conduct given them for their free and quiet passage
�
thence, and the return of every one to his own country.
XII.

But when it shall happen, that the ships of

either (as is above-mentioned) through danger of the
sea, or other urgent cause, be driven into the ports and
havens of the other, if they be three or four together,
and may give just ground of suspicion, they shall
immediately upon their arrival acquaint the Governor
or Chief Magistrate of the place with the cause of
their coming, and shall stay no longer than the said
Governor or Chief Magistrate will permit, and shall be
requisite for the furnishing themselves with victuals,
and reparation of their ships: and they shall always
take care not to carry out of their ships any goods or
packs, exposing them to sale, neither shall they re
ceive any merchandize on board, nor do any thing con
trary to this Treaty.
XIII.

Both Parties shall truly and firmly observe

and execute this present Treaty, and all and every the
matters therein contained, and effectually cause the
same to be observed and performed by the subjects and
inhabitants of either nation.
XIV.

No private injury shall in any sort weaken

this Treaty, nor beget hatred or dissentions between
the fore6._aid nations, but every one shall answer for
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his own proper fact, and be prosecuted thereupon; neither
shall one man satisfy for the offence of another by re
prisals, or other such like odious proceedings, unless
justice be denied or unreasonably delayed, in which
case it shall be lawful for that King, whose subject
hath suffered the loss and injury, to t'ake any course
according to the rules and method of the law of nations,
until reparation be made to the sufferer.

XV.

The present Treaty shall in nothing derogate

from any pre-eminence, rig�t, or dominion, of either
Confederate in the American seas, channels, or waters,
but that they have and retain the same in as full and
ample manner as may of right belong unto them; but it
is always to be understood, that the liberty of navi
gation ought in no manner to be disturbed, where nothing
is committed against the genuine sense and meaning of
these Articles.

In testimony of all and singular the contents

hereof, we, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries,
have signed and sealed this present Treaty, at Madrid,
8 th day of July 1670.
the rs
9
Signed
Wm. Godolphin (L.S.)

The Count of Penaranda, (L.S.) l

1Lewis Hertslett A Complete Collection of the
.
Treaties and Conventions and Reciprocal Regulations At
Present Subsistinr Between Great Hritain and Forei
Powers Vol. II London: Henry Butterworth, 1840 1 6-99°
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Definitive Treaty between Great Britain and Spain
(and France).
Signed at Paris, the 10th of February, 1763
Extract.
II.

(Translation, as laid before Parliament.)
The Treaties of Westphalia, of 1648; those of

Madrid, between the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain,
of 1667, and 1670; the Treaties of Peace of Nimeguen,
of 1678 and 1679; of Ryswick, of 1697; those of Peace
and of Commerce of Utrecht, of 1713; that of Baden, of
1714; the Treaty of the Triple Alliance of the Hague,
of 1717; that of the Quadruple Alliance of London, of
1718; the Treaty of Peace of Vienna, of 1738; the
Definitive Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, of 1748; and
that of Madrid, between the Crowns of Great Britain and
Spain, of 1750; as well as the Treaties between the
Crowns of Spain and Portugal, of the 13th of February,
1768, of the 6th of February, 1715, and of the 12th
of February, 1761; and that of the 11th of April, 1713,
between France and Portugal, with the guaranties of
Great Britain; serve as a basis and foundation to the
Peace, and to the present Treaty; and for this purpose,
they are all renewed and confirmed in the best form,
as well as all the Treaties in general, which subsisted
between the high Contracting Parties before the war, as
if they were inserted here word for word, so that they
are to be exactly observed for the future, in their whole
tenor, and religiously executed on all sides, in all
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their points which shall not be derogated from by the
-.....,...__ present Treaty, notwithstanding all that may have been
stipulated to the contrary by any of the high Contracting
Parties.

And all the said Parties declare, that they

will not suffer any privilege, favour or indulgence, to
subsist, contrary to the Treaties above confirmed, except
what shall have been agreed and stipulated by the present
Treaty.
XVI.

The decision of the prizes, made in time of

peace, by the subjects of Great Britain, on the Spaniards,
shall be referred to the Courts of Justice of the Ad
miralty of Great Britain, conformably to the rules
established among all nations, so that the validity of
the said prizes, between the British and Spanish nations,
shall be decided and judged according to the law of
nations, and according to Treaties, in the Courts of
Justice of the nation who shall have made the capture.
XVII.

His Britannic Majesty shall cause to be

demolished all the fortifications which His subjects
shall have erected in the Bay of Honduras, and other
pla�es of the Territory of Spain in that part of the
world, four months after the ratification of the
present Treaty: and His Catholic Majesty shall not
permit His Britannic Majesty's subjects, or their
workmen, to be disturbed, or molested, under any
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pretence whatsoever, in the said places, in their
occupation of cutting, loading, and carrying away
logwood: and for this purpose, they may build without
hindrance, and occupy without interruption, the houses
and magazines which are necessary for them, for their
families, and for their effects: and H{s Catholic
Majesty assures to them, by this Article, the full
enjoyment of those advantages and powers on the Spanish
coasts and Territories, as above stipulated, immediately
after the ratification of the present Treaty.
XVIII.

His Catholic Majesty desists, as well for

himself, as for His Successors, from all pretension,
which he may have formed in favour of the Guipuscoans,
and other His subjects, to the right of fishing in the
neighbourhood of the Island of Newfoundland.
Done at Paris, 10th February, 1763.
Signed
Bedford, C.P.S.(L.S.) Choiseul, Due de Praslin,(L.S�)
El Marquis de Grimaldi,(L.S.)�
Definitive Treaty between Great Britain and Spain
Signed at Versailles, September 3, 1783
Extract.
I.

(Translation, as laid before Parliament.)
There shall be a christian, universal, and

perpetual peace, as well by sea as by land, and a sincere

2 10c. cit., 233-235°
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and constant friendship shall be re-established between
Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties, and between
their Heirs and Successors, Kingdoms, Dominions, Pro
vinces, Countries, Subjects, and Vassals, of what
quality or condition soever they be, w�thout exception
either of places or persons; so that the high Contracting
Parties shall give the greatest attention to the main
taining between themselves and their said Dominions and
subjects, this reciprocal friendship and intercourse,
without permitting hereafter, on either Part, any kind
of hostilities to be committed, either by sea or by
land, for any cause, or under any pretence whatsoever;
and they shall �refully avoid, for the future, everything which might prejudice the union happily re-established
endeavouring, on the contrary, to procure reciprocally
for each other, on every occasion, whatever may contribute to their mutual glory, interests, and advantage,
without giving any assistance or protection, directly
or indirectly, to those who would do any injury to
either of the high Contracting Parties.

There shall

be a general oblivion and amnesty of every thing which
, may have been done or committed, before or since the
commencement of the war which is just ended.
II.

The treaties of Westphalia, of 1648; those

of Madrid, of 1667 and of 1670; those of Peace and of
Commerce of Utrecht, of 1713; that of Baden, of 1714;
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of Madrid, of 1715; of Seville, of 1729; the Definitive
·--...,,_

Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, of 1748; the Treaty of
Madrid, of 1750; and the Definitive Treaty of Paris,
of 1763; serve as a basis and foundation to the Peace,
and to the present Treaty; and for this purpose they
are all renewed and confirmed, in the best form, as
well as all the Treaties in general which subsisted
between the high Contracting Parties before the war,
and particularly all those which are specified and
renewed in the aforesaid Definitive Treaty of Paris,
in the best form, and as if they were herein inserted
word for word; so that they a re to be exactly observed
for the future in their full tenor, and religiously
executed by both Parties, in all the points which shall
not be derogated from by the present Treaty of Peace.
VI.

The intention of the two high Contracting

Parties being to prevent, as much as possible, all
the causes of complaint and misunderstanding hereto
fore occasioned by the cutting of wood for dyeing, or
logwood; and several English f)ettlements having been
formed and extended� under that pretence, upon the
Spanish continent; it is expressly agreed, that His
Britannic Majesty's subjects shall have the right of
cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood, in the
district lying between the rivers Wallis or Belize,
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and Rio-Hondo, taking the course of the said two rivers
for unalterable boundaries, so as that the navigation
of them be common to both nations, to wit, by the
river Wallis or Helize, from the sea, ascending as far
as opposite to a lake or inlet which runs into the
land and forms an isthmus, or neck, with another similar
inlet, which comes from the side of Rio-Nuevo, or New
River; so that the line of separation shall pass
straight across the said isthmus, and meet another
lake formed by the water of Rio-Nuevo, or New River,
at its current.

The said line shall continue with the

course of Rio Nuevo, descending as far as opposite to
a river, the source of which is marked in the map, be
tween Rio-Nuevo and Rio-Hondo, and which empties itself
into Rio-Hondo; which river shall also serve as a
common boundary as far as its junction with Rio-Hondo,
and from thence descending by Rio-Hondo to the sea, as
the whole is marked on the map which the Plenipotentiaries
of the two Crowns have thousht proper to make use of,
for ascertaining the points agreed upon, to the end
that a -;ood correspondence may r eign between the two
nations, and that the English workmen, cutters, and
labourers, may not trespass from an uncertainty of the

/

-�oundaries.

The respective Commissaries shall fix

upon convenient places, in �he territory above marked
out, in order that His Britannic Majesty's subjects,
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employed in the felling of logwood, may, without inter
ruption, build therein houses and magazines necessary
for themselves, their families, and their effects; and
His Catholic Majesty assur�s to them the enjoyment of
all that is expr6'6sed in the present Ar.ticle; provided
that these stipulations shall not be cohsidered as
dero_gating in any wise from His rights of Sovereignty.
Therefore all the English who may be dispersed in any
other parts, whether on the Spanish continent, or in
any of the islands whatsoever, dependent on the afore
said Spanish continent, and for whatever reason it
might be, without exception, shall retire within the
district which has been above described, in the space
of eighteen months, to be computed from the exchange
of the ratifications; and for this purpose orders
shall be issued on the part of His Britannic Majesty;
and on that of His Catholic Majesty, His governors
shall be ordered to grant to the English, dispersed,
every convenience possible for their removing to the
settlement agreed upon by the present Article, or for
their retiring whenever they shall think proper.

It is

likewise stipulated, that if any fortifications should
actually have been heretofore erected within the limits
marked out, His Britannic Majesty shall cause them all
to be demolished, and He will order His subjects not
to build any new ones.

The English inhabitants, who
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shall settle there for the cutting of logwood, shall
be permitted to enjoy a free fishery for their sub
sistence, on the coasts of the district above-agreed
on, or of the islands situated opposite thereto,
without being in any wise disturbed on.that account;
provided they do not establish themselves in any manner
on the said islands.
IX.

Immediately after the exchange of the rati

fications, the two high Contracting Parties shall name
Commissaries to treat concerning new arrangements of
commerce between the two nations, on the basis of
reciprocity and mutual convenience; which arrangements
shall be settled and concluded within the space of two
years, to be computed from the 1st of January, 1784.
Done at Versailles, the 3rd of September, 1783.
Signed
Manchester, (L.S.)

Le Comte d'Aranda, (L.S.)

British Declaration
The new state in which commerce may perhaps be found,
in all parts of the world, will demand revisions and
explanations of the subsisting Treaties; but an entire
abrogation of those Treaties, in whatever period it
might be, would throw commerce into such confusion as
would be of infinite prejudice to it.
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In some of the Treaties of this sort, there are
,/

,,/

not only Articles which relate merely to commerce, but
many others which ensure reciprocally, to the respective
subjects, privileges, facilities for conducting their
affairs, personal protections, and other advantages,
which are not, and which ought not to,be of a changeable
nature, such as the regulations relating merely to the

-.....,.

.

value of goods and merchandize, variable from circum
stances of every kind.
When therefore the state of the trade between the
two nations shall be treated upon, it is requisite to
be understood that the alterations which may be made
in the subsisting Treaties are to extend only to
arrangements merely commercial; and that the privileges
and advantages, mutual and particular, be not only
preserved on each side, but even augmented, if it can
be done.
In this view, His Majesty has consented to the
appointment of Commissaries, on each side, who shall
treat solely upon this object.
Done at Versailles, the 3d of September, 1783.
Signed

Manchester, (L.S.)

Spanish Counter-declaration
The Catholic King, in proposing new arrangements
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of commerce, has had no other design than to remedy,
by the rules of reciprocity and mutual convenience,
whatever may be defective in preceding Treaties of
Commerce.

The King of Great Britain may judge from

thence, that the intention of His Catholic Majesty is
not in any manner to cancel all the stipulations con
tained in the above-mentioned Treaties; He declares,
on the contrary, from henceforth, that He is disposed
to maintain all the privileges, facilities, and
advantages, expressed in the
old Treaties, as far as
,
they shall be re�iprocal, or compensated by equivalent
advantages.

It is to attain this end, desired on each

·side, that Commissaries are to be named to treat upon
the state of trade between the two nations, and that
a considerable space of time is to be allowed for
completing their work.

His Catholic Majesty hopes

that this object will be pursued with the same good
faith, and with the same spirit of conciliation, which
have presided over the discussion of all the other
points included in the Definitive Treaty; and His said
Majesty is equally confident that the respective
Commissaries will employ the utmost diligence for the
completion of this important work.
Done at Versailles, the 3d of September, 1783.
Signed
310c. cit., 235-245.

Le Comte d'Aranda, (L.s.)3
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Convention between Great Britain and Spain
Signed at London the 14th of July, 1786
(Translation, as laid before Parliament.)
The Kings of England and of Spain, animated with
the same desire of consolidating, by every means in their
power, the friendship so happily subsisting between
Them and Their Kingdoms, and wishing, with one accord,
to prevent even the shadow of misunderstanding which
might be occasioned by doubts, misconceptions, or
other causes of dispute between the subjects on the
frontiers of the two Monarchies, especially in distant
countries, as are those in America, have thought proper
to settle, with all possible good faith, by a new Con
vention, the points which might one day or other be
productive of such inconveniencies, as the experience
of former times has very often shewn.

To this end,

the King of Great Britain has named the most Noble and
most Excellent Lord, .Francis Baron Osborne, of Kiveton,
Marquis of Carmarthen, His Britannic Majesty's Privy
Councillor, and Principal Secreta�y of State for the
Department of Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c., and the
Catholic King has likewise authorized Don Bernardo del
Campo, Knight of the Noble'Order of Charles the Third,

�"

Secretary of the same Order, Secretary of the Supreme
\,, Council of 3tate, and His Minister Plenipotentiary to
,,

----------
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the King of Great Britain: who having communicated to
each other their respective full Powers, prepared in
due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:
I.

His Britannic Majesty's subjects, and the

other colonists who have hitherto enjoyed the pro
tection of England, shall evacuate th� country of the
Mosquitos, as well as the,continent in general, and
the islands adjacent, without exception, situated
beyond the line hereinafter described, as what ought
"'·--t.o,_be the frontier of the extent of territory granted
by His Catholic Majesty to the English, for the uses
specified in the 3d Article of the present Convention,
and in addition to the country already granted to them
in virtue of the stipulations agreed upon by the
Commissaries of the two Growns, in 1783.
II.

The Catholic King, to prove, on His side,

to the King of Great britain, the sincerity of His
sentiments of friendship towards His said Majesty and
the British nation, will grant to the English more
extensive limits than those specified in the last
Treaty of Peace: and the said limits of the lands added
by the present Convention shall for the future be
understood in the manner following:
The English line, beginnin� from the sea, shall
take the centre of the river Sibun or Jabon, and con
tinue up to the source of the said river; from thence
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it shall cross in a straight line the intermediate land,
'•.,�

till it intersects the river Wallis; and by the centre
of the same river, the said line shall descend to the
point where it will meet the line already settled and
marked out by the Commissaries of the two Crowns in
1783: which limits, following the continuation of the
said line, shall be observed as formerly stipulated by
the Definitive Treaty.
III.

Although no other advantages have hitherto

been in question, except that of cutting wood for dying,
yet His Catholic Majesty, as a greater proof of His
disposition to oblige the King of Great �ritain, will
grant to the English the liverty of cutting all other
wood, without even excepting maho�any, as well as
gathering all the fruits, or produce of the earth,
purely natural and uncultivated, which may besides
being carried away in their natural state, become an
object of utility or of commerce, whether for food or
for manufactures; but it is expressly agreed that this
stipulation is never to be used as a pretext for es
tablishing in that country any plantation of sugar,
coffee, cocoa, or other like articles; or any fabric
or manufacture by means of mills or other machines
whatsoever, (this restriction however does not regard
the use of saw mills, for cutting or otherwise preparing
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the wood,) since all the lands in question being in
disputably acknowledged to belong of right to the Crown
of Spain, no settlements of that kind, or the population
which would follow, could be allowed.
The En5lish shall be permitted to.transport and
convey all such wood, and other produce of the place,
in its natural and uncultivated state, down the rivers
to the sea, but without ever going beyond the limits
which are prescribed to them by the stipulations above
granted, and without thereby taking an opportunity of
ascending the said rivers, beyond their bounds, into
the countries belon�ing to Spain.
IV.

The English shall be permitted to occupy the

small Island known by the names of Casina, St. George's
'

Key, or Cayo Casina, in consideration of the circumstance

·of

that part of the coasts opposite to the said Island

being looked upon as subject to dangerous disorders;
but this permission is only to be made use of for pur
poses of real utility: and as great abuses, no less
contrary to the intentions of the British Government,
that to the essential interest of Spain, miGht arise
from this permission, it is here stipulated, as an
indispensable condition, that no fotficiation, or work
of defence whatever, shall at any time be erected there,
nor any body of troops posted, nor any piece of artillery
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kept there; and in order to verify with good faith the
accomplishment of this condition sine qua non (which
might be infringed by individuals, without the knowledge
of the British Government) a Spanish officer of Commissary,
accompanied by an English Commissary or.officer, duly
authorized, shall be admitted, twice a·year, to examine
into the real situation of things.
V.

The English nation shall enjoy the liverty of

refitting their merchant ships in the southern triangle,
included between the point of Cayo Casina, and the
cluster of small islands, which are situated opposite
that part of the coast occupied by the cutters, at
the distance of eight leabues from the river Wallis,
seven from Cayo Q_asina, and three from the river Sibun,
a place which has always been found well adapted to
',.___th
_ at purpose.

For which end, the edifices and store

houses, absolutely necessary for that service, shall
be allowed to be built; but in this concession is also
included the express condition of not erecting forti
fications there at any time, or stationing troops, or
constructing any military works; and in like manner
it shall not be permitted to station any ships of war
there, or to construct an arsenal, or other building,
the object of which might be the formation of a naval
establishment.
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VI.

It is also stipulated, that the English may

freely and peaceably catch fish on the coast of the
country assigned to them by the last Treaty of Peace,
as also of that which is added to them by the present
Convention; but without ,-!;Oin::; beyond their boundaries,
and confinin� themselves within the distance specified
in the preceding Article.
VII.

All the restrictions specified in the last

Treaty of 1783, for the entire preservation of the
right of the Spanish Soverei�nty over the country, in
which is granted to the English only the privilege of
making use of the wood of the different kinds, the
fruits and other produce, in their natural state, are
here confirmed; and the same restrictions shall also
be observed with respect to the new grant.

In consequence,

the inhabitants of those countries shall employ themselves
simply in the cutting and transporting of the said wood,
and in the gathering and transporting of the fruits,
without mediating any more extensive settlements, or
the formation of any system of �overnment, either
military or civil, further than such regulation as
Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties may hereafter
judge proper to establish, for maintaining peace and
good order amongst Their respective subjects.
VIII.

As it is generally allowed that the woods
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and forests are preserved, and even multiply, by regular
and methodical cuttings, the �nglish shall observe this
maxim, as far as possible; but if, notwithstanding all
their precautions, it should happen in course of time
that they were in want of dying-wood, pr mahogany, with
which the Spanish Possessions mi�ht be provided, the
Spanish Government shall make no difficulty to furnish
a supply to the English, at a fair and reasonable price.
IX.

Every possible precaution shall be observed

to prevent smuggling; and the English shall take care
to conform to the regulations which the Spanish �overn
ment shall think proper to establish amongst their own
subjects, in all communications which they may have
with the latter; on condition nevertheless that the
English shall be left in the peaceable enjoyment of the
several advantages inserted in their favour in the
last Treaty, or stipulated by the present Conve�tion.
X.

The Spanish Governors shall be ordered to give

to the said English, dispersed, all possible facilities
for their removal to the settlements agreed upon by the
present Convention, according to the stipulations of
the 6th Article of the Definitive Treaty of 1783, with
respect to the country allotted for their use by the
said Article.
XI.

Their �ritannic and Catholic Majesties, in
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order to remove every kind of doubt with regard to the
true construction of the present Convention, think it
necessary to declare that the conditions of the said
Convention ought to be ovserved according to their
sincere intention to ensure and improve the harmony
and good understanding which so happily subsist at
present between Their said Majesties.
In this view, His Britannic Majesty engages to
�ive the most positive orders for the evacuation of
the countries above-mentioned, by all His subjects of
whatever denomination; but if, contrary to such
declaration, there should still remain any persons so
daring as to presume, by retiring into the interior
country, to endeavour to obstruct the entire evacuation
already agreed upon, His rlritannic Majesty, so far from
affording them the least succour, or even protection,
will disavow them in the most solemn manner, as He
will equally do those who may hereafter attempt to
settle upon the territory belongin� to the Spanish
Dominion.
XII.

The evacuation agreed upon shall be com

pletely effected within the space of six months, after
the exchan�e of the ratifications of this Convention,
or sooner if it can be done.
XIII.

It is agreed that the new grants described
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in the preceding Articles, in favour of the English
nation, are to take place as soon as the aforesaid
evacuation shall be entirely accomplished.

XIV.

His Catholic Majesty, prompted solely by

motives of humanity, promises to the King of England
that He will not exercise any act of severity against
the Mosquitos, inhabitin� in part the countries which
are to be evacuated, by virtue of the present Con
vention, on account of the connections which may have
subsisted between the said Indians and the English; and
His Britannic Majesty, on His part, will strictly pro
hibit all His subjects from furnishin:� arms, or war
like stores, to the Indians in general, situated upon
the frontiers of the Spanish possessions.
Xv.

The two Courts shall mutually transmit to

each other duplicates of the orders which they are to
dispatch to their respective governors and commanders
in America, for the accomplishment of the present
Convention; and a frigate, or proper ship of war, shall
be appointed, on each side, to observe in conjunction
that all things are performed in the best order possible
and with that cordiality and 500d faith of which the
two Sovereigns have been pleased to set the example.
XVI.

The present Convention shall be ratified

by Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties, and the
ratifications exchanged within the space of six weeks,
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or sooner if it can be done.
In witness whereof, we the undersigned Ministers
Plenipotentiary of Their Britannic and Catholic
Majesties, in virtue of our respective full Powers,
have signed the present Convention, a�d have affixed
thereto the seals of our arms.
Done at London, this 14th day of July, 1786.
Signed
Carmarthen, (L.S.)

Le Chev. del Campo, (L.S.)

4

Treaty between Great Britain and Spain
Signed at London, the l�th of January, 1809.
Extract.
The events which have taken place in Spain having
terminated the state of hostility which unfortunately
subsisted between the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain,
and united the arms of both against the common enemy,
it seems good that the new relations which have been
produced between two nations, now connected by common
interest, should be regularly established and confirmed
by a formal Treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance:
wherefore, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Supreme and
410c. cit., 245-255-
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Central Junta of Government of Spain and the Indies,
acting in the name and on the behalf of His Catholic
Majesty Ferdinand VII, have constituted and appointed;
--that is to say, His Majesty the King of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honour
able George Canning, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable
Privy Council, and His Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs; and the Supreme and Central Junta of
Government of Spain and the Indies, acting in the name
and on the behalf of His Catholic Majesty Ferdinand
VII, Don Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, Commander of Vallaga and
Algarga in the Military Order of Calatrava, Rear Admiral
of the Royal Navy, named by the Supreme and Central
Junta of Government of Spain and the Indies, as Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His
Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII, to His Britannic Majesty;
their Plenipotentiaries, to conclude and si�n a Treaty
of Peace, friendship, and alliance;--who, having
communicated their respective full Powers, have agreed
to and concluded the followin� Articles:
I.

There shall be between His Majesty the King

of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and
His Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII, King of Spain and
of the Indies thereunto appertaining, and between all
their Kingdoms, States, Dominions, and subjects, a
christian, stable, andinviolable peace, and a perpetual
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and sincere amity, and a strict alliance during the war
against France; together with an entire and lasting
oblivion of all acts of hostility done on either side,
in the course of the late wars, in which they have been
engaged against each other.
II.

To obviate all complaints and disputes which

might arise on the subject of prizes, captured posterior
to the Declaration published by His Britannic Majesty
on the 4th of July of the last year, it has been
mutually agreed, that the vessels and property taken
posterior to the date of the said Declaration, in any
seas or ports of the world, without any exception and
without any regard either to time or place, shall be
restored by both Parties.--And, as the accidental
occupation of any of the ports of the Peninsula by the
common enemy, mi f�ht occasion disputes respecting any
vessels, which, in ignorance of such occupation, might
direct their course to those ports from any other
harbour, either of the Peninsula or the Colonies; and
as cases may occur in which Spanish inhabitants of the
said ports or provinces, so occupied by the enemy, may,
with their property, endeavour to escape from his
grasp; the high Contracting Parties have agreed that
Spanish vessels, not aware of the enemy's occupation
of any harbour which they are desirous to enter, or
such as may succeed in making their escape from any
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harbour so occupied, shall not be captured, nor them
selves nor their cargo be considered as a good prize;
but, on the contrary, that they shall meet with every
help and assistance from the naval power of His Britannic
Majesty.
Done at London, this 14th day of January, 1809.
Signed
George 0anning, (L.S.)
Additional Article.

Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, (L.S.)

Signed at London, 21st March, 1809.

The present circumstances not admitting of the
regular negociation of a Treaty of vommerce between the
two countries, with all the care and consideration due
to so important a subject, the high Contracting Parties
mutually engage to proceed to such ne1�ociation as soon
as it shall be practicable so to do, affording, in the
mean time, mutual facilities to the co�merce of the
subjects of each other, by temporary regulations
founded on principles of reciprocal utility.
The present Additional Article shall have the
same force and validity, as if it were inserted, word
for word, in the Treaty of peace, friendship, and
alliance, signed at London, the 14th day of January, 1809.
In witness whereof, we, the undersigned Plenipoten
tiaries, have signed, in virtue of our respective full
Powers, the present Additional Article, and have sealed
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it with the seals of our arms.
Done at London, this 21st day of March, 1809.
Signed
George Canning, (L.S.)

New Granada:

Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, (L.s.) 5

December 12, 1846

Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and
Commerce, with additional article, si�ned at
�ogota December 12, 1846. Original in En0lish
and Spanish.
Submitted to the Senate February 15, 1847.
(Message of February 10, 1847.) Resolution of
advice and consent June 3, 1848. Ratified by
the United States June 10, 1848. Ratified by
New Granada July 15, 1847. Ratifications
exchanged at Washington June 10, 1848. Pro
claimed June 12, 1848.
A general Treaty of peace, amity, navigation and
commerce between the United States of America and the
Republic of New Granada.
The United States of North America and the Hepublic
of New Granada in South America, desiring to make
lasting and firm the friendship and good understanding
which happily exists between both nations have resolved
to fix in a manner clear, distinct and positive, the
sules which shall in future be religiously observed
between each other be means of a treaty, or general
convention of peace and friendship, commerce and
510c. cit., 263-267.
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navigation.
For this desirable object the President of the
United States of America has conferred ful powers on
Benjamin A. Bidlack a citizen of the said States and
their Charge d'Affaires in Bogota, and.the President
of the Republic of New Granada has conferred similar
and equal powers upon Manuel Maria Mallarino Secretary
of State and foreign relations, who, after having
exchanged their said full powers in due form, have
agreed to the following articles.
Article 1st
There shall be a perfect, firm and inviolable
peace and sincere friendship between the United States
of America and the Republic of New Granada, in all the
extent of their possessions and territories, and be
tween their citizens respectilvely, without dis
tinction of persons or places.
Article 2d
The United States of America and the Republic of
New Granada, desiring to live in peace and harmony
with all the nations of the earth, by means of a policy
frank and equally friendly with all, engage mutually
not to grant any particular favor to other nations,
in respect of commerce and navigation, which shall not
immediately become common to the other party, who shall

1�
enjoy the same freely, if the concession was freely
made, or on allowing the same compensation, if the
concession was conditional.
Article 3rd
The two high contracting parties, being likewise
desirous of placing the commerce and navigation of
their respective countries on the liveral basis of
perfect equality and reciprocity, mutually agree that
the citizens of each may frequent all the coasts and
countries of the other, and reside and trade there, in
all kinds of produce, manufactures and merchandize;
and that they shall enjoy, all the rights, privileges
and exemptions, in navigation and commerce, which
native citizens do or shall enjoy, submitting them
selves to the laws, decrees and usages there established,
to which native citizens are subjected.

But it is

understood that this article does not include the
coasting trade of either country, the regulation of
which is reserved by the parties respectively according
to their own separate laws.
Article 4th
They likewise agre that whatever kind of produce,
manufacture or merchandize of any foreign country can
be, from time to time, lawfully imported into the
United States in their own vessels, may be also im
ported in vessels of the Republic of New Granada; and
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that no higher or other duties upon the tonnage of the
vessel and her cargo, shall be levied and collected,
whether the importation be made in vessels of the one
country or of the other.

And in like manner, that

whatever kind of produce, manufactures or merchandize
of any foreign country, can be from time to time
lawfully imported into the Republic of New Granada
in its own vessels, may be also imported in vessels
of the United States; and that no hi6her or other

duties, upon the tonnage of the vessel and her cargo,
shall be levied or collected, whether the importation
be made in vessels of the one country or the other.
And they further agree, that whatever may be law
fully exported or reexported, from the one country, in
its own vessels to any foreign country, may in like
manner be exported or reexported, in the vessels of
the other country.

And the same bounties, duties and

drawbacks, shall be allowed and collected, whether
such exportation or reexportation, be made in vessels
of the United States or of the Republic of New Granada.
Article 5th
No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the
importation into the United States of any articles the
produce or manufacture of the Republic of New Granada,
and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the
importation into the Republic of New Granada of any
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articles the produce or manufacture of the United States,
than are or shall be parable on the like articles being
the produce or manufactures of any other foreign country;
nor shall any higher or other duties or charges be
imposed in either of the two countries on the exportation
of any articles to the United States or to the Republic of New Granada respectively, than such as are payable
on the exportation of the like articles to any other
foreign country, nor shall any prohibition be imposed
on the exportation or importation of any articles, the
produce or manufactures of the United States or of
the Republic of New Granada to or from the territories
of the United States or to or from the territories of
the Republic of New Granada which shall not equally
extend to all other nations.
Article 6th
In order to prevent the possibility of any mis
understanding, it is hereby declared that the stipu
lations contained in the three preceding articles are
to their full extent aplicable to the vessels of the
United States and their cargoes arriving in the ports
of New Granada, and reciprocally to the vessels of the
said Republic of New Granada and their gargoes arriving
in the ports of the United States; whether they proceed
from the ports of the country to which they respectively
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belong, or from the ports of any other foreign country;
and in either case no discriminating duty shall be im
posed or collected in the ports of either country on
said vessels or their careoes, whether the same shall
be of native or foreign produce or manufacture.
Article 7th
It is likewise agreed, that it shall be wholly free
for all merchants, commanders of ships, and other citizens
of both countries to manage by themselves or agents
their own business in all the ports and places subject
to the jurisdiction of each other, as well with respect
to the consienments and sale of their goods and mer
chandize by whole sale or retail, as with respect to:
the loading, unloading and sending off their ships;
they being, in all these cases, to be treated as
citizens of the country in which they reside, or at
least to be placed on an equality with the subjects or
citizens of the most favored nation.
Article 8th
The citizens of neither of the contracting parties
shall be liable to any embar�o, nor be detained with
their vessels, cargoes, merchandize or effects for any
military expedition, nor for any public or private
purpose whatever, without allowing to those interested
an equitable and sufficient indemnification.
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Article 9th
Whenever the citizens of either of the contracting
parties shall be forced to seek refuge or assylum, in
the rivers, bays, ports or dominions of the other with
their vessels, whether merchant or of war, public or
private, through stress of weather, pursuit of pirates
or enemies, or want of provisions or water, they shall
be received and treated with humanity, 0iving to them
all favor and protection for repairing their ships,
procuring provisions, and placing themselves in a
situation to continue their voyage, without obstacle
or hindrance of any kind or the payment of port fees or
any charges other than pilotage, except such vessels
continue in port longer than forty ei::sht hours counting
from the time they cast anchor in port.
Article 10th
All the ships, merchandize and effects belongin6

to the citizens of one of the contracting parties,

which may be captured by pirates, whether within the
limits of its jurisdiction or on the high seas, and
may be carried or found in the rivers, roads, bays,
ports or dominions of the other, shall be delivered
up up to the owners, they proving in due and proper
form their ri8hts, before the competent tribunals:
being well understood that the claim shall be made

it
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within the term of one year by the parties themselves,
their attorneys, or agents of their respective J-overnments.
Article 11th
When any vessels belonging to the citizens of either
of the contracting parties shall be wrecked or foundered
or shall suffer any damage on the coasts, or within the
dominions of the other, there shall be given to them
all assistance and protection, in the same manner which
is usual and customary with the vessels of the nation
where the damai;e happens: permittine; them to unload
the said vessel, if necessary, of its merchandize and
effects, without exactins for it any duty, impost or
contribution whatever, unless they may be destined for
the consumption or sale in the country of the port where
they may have been disembarked.
Article 12th
The citizens of each of the contracting parties
shall have power to dispose of their personal 80ods
or real estate within the jurisdiction of the other,
by sale, donation, testament, or otherwise, and their
representatives being citizens of the other party,
shall succeed to their said personal goods or real
estate, whether b1 testament or ab intestate, and they
may take possession thereof, either by themselves or
others acting for them, and dispose of the same at their
will, paying such dues only as the inhabitants of the
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country, wherein said goods are, shall be subject to
pay in like cases.
Article 13th
Both contracting parties promise and engage for
mally to give their special protection to the persons
and property of the citizens of each other, of all
occupations, who may be in the territories subject to
the jurisdiction of one or the other, transient or
dwelling therein, leaving open and free to them the
tribunals of justice for their judicial recourse, on
the same terms which are usual and customary with the
natives or citizens of the country; for which purpose
they may either appear in proper person or employ
in the prosecution or defense of their rights such
advocates, solicitors, notaries, agents and factors as
they may judge proper in all their trials at law; and
such citizens or agents shall have free opportunity to
be present at the decisions or sentences of the tribunals,
in all cases which may concern them, and likewise at
the taking of all examinations and evidence which may
be exhibited in the said trials.
Article 14th
The citizens of the United States residing in the
territories of the Republic of New Granada, shall enjoy
the most perfect and entire security of conscience
without being annoyed, prevented, or disturbed on
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account of their religious belief.

Neither shall they

be annoyed, molested or disturbed on the proper exer
cise of their religion in private houses or on the
Chapels or places of worship appointed for that purpose,
providing that in so doing they observe the decorum
due to divine worship, and the respect due to the laws,
usages and customs of the country.

Liberty shall also

be granted to bury the citizens of the United States
who may die in the in the territories of the nepublic
of New Granada in convenient and adequate places to
be appointed and established by themselves for that
purpose, with the knowledge of the local authorities,
or in such other places of sepulture as may be chosen
by the friends of the deceased; nor shall the funerals
or sepulchres of the dead be disturbed in any wise nor
upon any account.
In like manner the citicens of New Granada shall
enjoy, within the Government and territories of the
United States, a perfect and unrestrained liberty of
conscience and of exercisin1� their religion, publicly
or privately, within their own dwelling houses, or on
the chapels and places of worship appointed for that
purpose, agreeably to the laws, usages & customs of
the United States.
Article 15th
It shall be lawful for the citizens of the United

162
States of America and of the Republic of New Granada
to sail with their ships, with all manner of liberty
and security, no distinction being made who are the
proprietors of the rnerchandize laden thereon, from
any port to the places of those who now are or here
after shall be at enmity with either of the contracting
parties.

It shall likewise be lawful for the citizens

aforesaid to sail with the ships and merchandize before
mentioned and to trade with the same liberty and security
from the places, ports and havens of those

who are

enimies of both or either party, without any opposition
or disturbance whatsoever, not only directly from the
places of the enemy before mentioned to neutral places,
but also from one place belon�ing to an enemy to another
place belonging to an enemy, whether they be under the
jurisdiction of one power or under several.

And it is

hereby stipulated that free ships shall also give
freedom to r-;oods, and that every thing which shall be
found on board the ships below�ing to the citizens of
either of the contracting parties, shall be deemed to
be free and exempt, although the whole ladin; or any
part thereof should appertain to the enemies of
either (contraband goods being always excepted.)

It

is also agreed in like manner, that the same liberty
shall be extended to persons who are on board a free
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ship, with this effect, that althou�h they be enemies
to both or either party, they are not to be taken out
of that free ship, unless they are officers and soldiers,
and in the actual service of the enemies:

provided

however, and it is hereby agreed, that the stipulations
in this article contained, declaring that the flag
shall cover the property, shall be understood as apply
ing to those powers only, who recognize this principle,
but if either of the two contracting parties shall be
at war with a third, and the other remains neutral, the
flag of the neutral shall cover the property of the
enemies whose Governments aclmowledge this principle
and not of other.
Article 16th
It is likewise agreed, that in the case where the
neutral flag of one of the contracting parties shall
protect the property of the enemies of the other, by
virtue of the above stipulation, it shall always be under
stood that the neutral property found on board such
enemy's vessels, shall be held and considered as
enemy's property, and as such shall be liable to
de�ention and confiscation, except such property as was
put on board such vessel before the declaration of war,
or even afterwards, if it were done without the knowledge
of it; but the contracting parties agree that two months
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having elapsed after the declaration of war, their
citizens shall not plead isnorance thereof.

On the

contrary, if the flag of the neutral does not protect
the enemy's property, in that case, the goods and
merchandize of the neutral embarked on such enemy's
ship shall be free.
Article 17th
This liberty of navisation and commerce shall
extend to all kinds of merchandize, excepting those
only which are distinguished by the name of contraband;
·and under this name of contraband, or prohibited goods,
shall be comprehended.
1st Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunder
busses, musk-ets, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes,
swords, sabres, lances, spears, halberts; and granades,
bombs, powder, matches, balls and all other things be
longing to the use of these arms.
2nd Bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of
mail, infantry belts, and clothes made up in the form
and for the military use.
3d Cavalry belts, and horses with their furniture.
4th And generally all kind of arms and instruments
of iron, steel, brass, and copper, or of any other
materials manufacture� prepared and formed, expressly
to make war by sea or land.
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5th Provisions that are imported into a besieged
or blockaded place.
Article 18th
All other merchandize and things not comprehended
in the articles of contraband, explicitly enumerated
and classified as above, sha�l be held and considered
as free, and subjects of free and lawful commerce, so
that they may be carried and transported in the freest
manner by the citizens of both the contractin[; parties,
even to places belongin� to an enemy, excepting those
places only which are at that time besie�ed or block
aded; and to avoid all doubt in this particular, it
is delcared, that those places only are besieged, or
blockaded, which are actually attacked by a belligerant
force capable �f preventin� the entry of the neutral.
Article 19th
The articles of contraband, before enumerated
and classified, which may be found in a vessel bound
for an enemy's port, shall be subject to detention and
confiscation, leaving free the rest of the cargo and
the ship, that the owners may dispose of them as they
see proper.

No vessel of either of the two nations

shall be detained on the high seas on account oi' having
on board articles of contraband, whenever the master,
captain, or supercarf,o of said vessels will deliver
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up the articles of contraband to the captor, unless
the quantity of such articles be so great and of so
large a bulk, that they cannot be received on board
the capturing ship without great inconvenience; but in
this and all other cases of just detention, the vessel
detained shall be sent to the nearest convenient and
safe port, for trial and judgment according to law.
Article 20th
And whereas it frequently happens, that vessels
sail for a port or place belonging to an enemy, without knowing that the same is besieged or blockaded or
invested, it is a3reed that every vessel so circumstancied
may be turned away from such port or place, but shall
not be detained, nor shall any part of her cargo, if
not contraband, be confiscated, unless, after warning
of such blockade or investment, from the commanding
officer of the blockadin� forces, she shall again
attempt to enter; but she shall be permitted to go to
any other port or place she shall think proper.

Nor

shall any vessel that may have entered into such port
before the same was actually besieged, blockaded or
invested by the other, be restrained from quitting
that place with her car��o, nor if found therein, after
the reduction and surrender, shall such vessel or her
cargo be liable to confiscation, but they shall be
restored to the owners thereof.
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Article 21st
In order to prevent all kind of disorder in the
visiting and examination of the ships and cargoes of
both the contracting parties on the hi�h seas, they
have agreed mutually, that whenever a national vessel
of war, public or private, shall meet with a neutral
of the other contracting party, the first shall remain
out of cannon shot, unless in stress of weather, and
may send its boat with two or three men only, in order
to execute the said examination of the papers concerning
the ownership and cargo of the vessel, without causing
the least extortion, violence or ill treatment, for
which the commanders of said armed ships shall be
respondible with their persons and property; for which
purpose the comoanders of private armed vessels shall,
before receiving their commissions, give sufficient
security to answer for all the damages they may com:iit.
And it is expressly agreed, that the neutral party shall
in no case be required to go on board the examining
vessel, for the purpose of exhibiting her papers, or
'for any other· purpose whatever.
Article 22nd
To avoid all kind of vexation and abuse in the
examination of the papers relatin� to the ownership
of the vessels belonging to the citizens of the two
contracting parties, they have agreed, and do hereby
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agree, that in case one of them should be engaged in
war, the ships and vessels belonging to the citizens
of the other must be furnished with sea letters or pass
ports, expressing the name, property and bulk of the ship,
as also the name and place of habitation of the master
and commander of the said vessel, in order that it may
thereby appear, that the ship really and truly belongs
to the citizens of one of the parties; they have like
wise agreed, that when such ships have a cargo, they
shall also be provided, be-sides the said sea letters
or passports, with certificates containing the several
particulars of the cargo, and the place whence the
ship sailed, so that it may be known, whether any for
bidden or contraband goods are on board the same, which
certificates shall be made out by the officers of the
place whence the ship sailed, in the accustomed form,
without which requisites, said vessel may be detained,
to be adjudged by the competent tribunal, and may be
declared lawful prize, unless the said defect shall be
proved to be owin� to accident and shall be satisfied
or supplied by testimony entirely equivalent.
Article 23d
It is further agreed, that the stipulations above
expressed, relative to the visiting and examination of
vessels, shall apply only to those which sail without
convoy, and when said vessels shall be under convoy,
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the verbal declaration of the commander of the convoy,
on his word of honor, that the bessels under his pro
tection belon� to the nation whose flag he carries, and
when they may be bound to an enemy's port, that they
have no contraband goods on board, shall be sufficient.
Article 24th
It is further agreed, that, in all cases, the
established courts for prize causes, in the country to
which the prizes may be conducted, shall alone take
cognizance of them.

And whenever such tribunals of

either party shall pronounce judgment against any
vessel or goods or property claimed by the citizens
of the other party, the sentence or decree shall
mention the reasons or motives upon which the same
shall have been founded, and an authenticated copy
of the sentence or decree and of all the proceedings
in the case, shall if demanded, be delivered to the
commander or agent of said vessel, without any delay,
he paying the legal fees for the same.
Article 25th
For the purpose of lessenin� the evils of war, the
two hi8h contracting parties, farther agree that, in
case a war should unfurtunately take place between them,
hostilities shall only be carried on by persons duly
commissioned by the Government, and by those under
their orders, except in repelling an attack or invasion,
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and in the defense of property.
Article 26th
Whenever one of the contracting parties shall be
engaged in war with another State, no citizen of the
other contracting party shall accept a commission or
letter of marque, for the purpose of assisting or
cooperating hostilely with the said enemy against the
said parties so at war, under the pain of being treated
as a pirate.
Article 27th
If by any fatality which cannot be expected, and
God forbid, the two contracting parties should be en
gaged in a war with each other, they have agreed and
do agree now for then, that there shall be allowed the
term of six months to merchants residing on the coasts
and in the ports of each other, and the term of one
year to those who dwell in the interior, to arrange
their ousiness e.nd transport their effects wherever
they please,

,;iving to them the saf econduct necessary

for it, which may serve as a sufficient protection
until they arrive at the designated port.

The citizens

of all other occupations, who may be established in
the territories or dominions of the United States or
of New Granada, shall be respected, and maintained in
the full enjoyment of their personal liberty and
property, unless their_ particular conduct, shall cause
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them to forfit this protection, which in consideration
of humanity, the contractin2; parties engage to give
them.
Article 28th
Neither the debts due from individuals of the one
nation to the individuals of the other, nor shares, nor
money which they may have in public funds, nor in public
or private banks, shall ever in any event of war or of
national difference be sequestered or confiscated.
Article 29th
Both the contractin� parties being desirous of
avoiding all inequality, in relation to their public
cornr.iunica-cions and official intercourse, have agreed
and do agree to grant to the envoys, ministers, and
other public agents, the same favors, immunities and
exemptions, which those of the most favored na�ions
do or shall enjoy, it being understood that, whatever
favors, immunities or privileges, the United States of
America or the Republic of New Granada may find it
proper to -�ive to the ministers and public agents of
any other power, shall, by the same act, be extended
to those of each of the contracting parties.
Article 30th
To make mor effectual the protection which the
United ;;tates and the Republic of New Granada shall
afford ih future to the navigation and commerce of the
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citizens of each other, they agree to receive and admit
Consuls and Viceconsuls, in all the ports open to foreign
commerce, who shall enjoy in them all the rights, pre
rogatives and immunities of the Consuls and Viceconsuls
of the most favored nation, each contracting party,
however, remainin;_at liberty to except those ports and
places in which the admission and residence of such
Consuls may not seem convenient.
Article 31st
In order that the Consuls and viceconsuls of the
two contracting parties may enjoy the rights, prero�atives
and immunities which belon� to them, by their public
character, they shall, before entering on the exercise
of their functions, exhibit their commission, or patent,
in due form,
to the }overnment to which they are ac1
creditted, and having obtained their Ex:equatur, they
shall be held and considered as such by all the
authorities, magistrates and inhabitants in the con
sular district in which they reside.
Article 32d
It is likewise a�reed that the Consuls, their
Secretaries, officers and persons attached to the
service of Consuls, they not bein� citizens of the
country in which the Consul resides, shall be exempt
from all public service, and also from all kind of
taxes, imposts and contr·ibutions, except those which
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they shall be obliged to pay on account of commerce or
their property, to which the citizens and inhabitants
native and forei"jn of the cow1try in which they reside
are subject, being in every thing besides subject to
the laws of the respective States.

The archives and

papers of the Consulates shall be respected inviolably,
and under no pretext, whatever, shall any magistrate
seize, or, in any way, interfere with them.
Article 33d
The said Consuls shall have power to require the
assistance of the authorities of the country, for the
arrest, detention and custody of deserters from the
public and private vessels of their country, and for
that purpose they shall address themselves, to the
courts, judges, and officers competent, and shall de
mand in writing the said deserters, proving by an
exhibition of the registers of the vessel's or ship's
roll, or other public documents, that those men were
part of the said crews; and on this demand so proved
(savin� however where the contrary is proved by other
testimonies) the delivery shall not be refused:

Such

deserters, when arrested, shall be put at the disposal
of the said Consuls, and may be put in the public prisons,
at the request and expense of those who relcaim them,
to be sent to the ships to which they belonged, or to
others of the same nation.

But if they be not sent
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back within two months, to be counted from the day of
their arrest, they shall be set at liberty, and shall
be no more arrested for the same cause.
Article 34th
For the purpose of more effectually protecting
their commerce and navigation, the two contracting
parties do hereby agree to form as soon hereafter as
circumstances will permit, a consular convention, which
shall declare specially the powers and immunities of the
Consuls and Viceconsuls of the respective parties.
Article 35th
The United States of America and the Republic of
New Granada desiring to make as durable as possible,
the relations which are to be established between the
two parties by virtue of this treaty, have declared
solemnly, ando do agree to the following points.
1st For the better understanding of the preceding
articles, it is, and has been stipulated, between the
high contracting parties, that the citizens, vessels,
and merchandize of the United States shall enjoy in
the ports of New Granada, including those of the part
of the granadian territory generally denominated
Isthmus of Panama from its southermost extremity until
the boundary of Costa Rica, all the exemptions, privi
leges a.nd immunities, concerning commerce and navigation,
which are now, or may hereafter by enjoyed by Granadian
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citizens, their vessels and merchandize; and that this
equality of favours shall be made to extend to the
passengers, correspondence and merchandize of the United
States in their transit across the said territory, from
one sea to the other.

The Government of New Granada

guarantees to the Government of the Uni"ted States, that
the right of way or t:r.·ansi t across the Isthmus of Panama,
upon any mo_des of communication that now exist, or that
may be, hereafter, constructed, shall be open and free
to the Government and citizens of the United States,
and for the transportation of any articles of produce,
manufactures or merchandize, of lawful commerce, belong
ing to the citizens of the United States, that no other
tolls or charges shall be levi�d or collected upon the
citizens of the United States, or their said merchandize
thus passing over any road or canal that may be m�de by
the authority of the same, than is under like circum
stances levied upon and collected from the granadian
citizens: that any lawful produce, inanufactures or
merchandize belonging to citizens of the United States
thus passing from one sea to the other, in either dir
ection, for the purpose of exportation to any other
foreign country, shall not be liable to any import duties
whatever; or having paid such duties, they shall be
entitled to drawback, upon their exportation; nor shall
the citizens of the United States be liable to any duties,

I
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tolls, or charges of any kind to which native citizens
are not subjected for thus passing the said Isthmus.
And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and
constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an
especial compensation for the said advantages and for
the favours they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and
6th articles of this rreaty, the United States guarantee
1

positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the
present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the
before mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free
transit from the one to the other sea, may not be inter
rupted or embarassed in any future time while this Treaty
exists; and in consequence, the United States also
guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty
and property which New Granada has and possesses over
the said territory.
2d The present Treaty shall remain in full force
and vigor for the term of twenty years, from the day
of exchan�e of the ratifications; and, from the same
day, the treaty that was concluded between the United
States and Colombia on the 13th of October 1824, shall
cease to have effect, notwithstanding what was disposed
in the 1st point of its 31st article.
3rd Notwithstanding the foregoing, if neither
party notifies to the other its intention of refor□ing
any of, or all, the articles of this treaty twelve months
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before the expiration of the twenty years, stipulated
above, the said treaty shall continue binding on both
parties, beyond t�e said twenty years, until twelve
months from the time that one of the parties notifies
its intention of proceeding to a reform.
4th If any one or more of the citizens of either
party shall infringe any of the articles of this treaty,
such citizens shall be held personally responsible for
the same, and the harmony and good correspondence be
tween the nations shall not be interrupted thereby; each
party engaging in no way to protect the offender, or
sanction such violation.
5th If, unfortunately, any of the articles con
tained in this treaty should be violated or infringed
in any way whatever, it is expressly stipulated that
neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or
authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war
against the other on complaints of injuries or damages,
until the said party considering itself offended shall
have laid before the other� statement of such injuries
or damages, verified by competent proofs, demanding
justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been
denied, in violation of the laws and of international
right.
6th Any special or remarkable advantage that one
or the other power may enjoy, from the foregoing
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stipulations, are and ought to be always understood in
virtue and as in compensation of the obligations they
have just contracted and which have been specified in
the first number of this article.
Article 36th
The present treaty of peace, amity, commerce and
navigation shall be approved and ratified by the
President of the United States, by and with the advice
and consent of the senate thereof, and by the President
of the Republic of New Granada with the consent and
approbation of the Congress of the same, and the
ratifications shall be exchanged in the city of
Washington, within eighteen months from the date of
the signature thereof, or sooner, if possible.
In faith whereof, we the Plenipotentiaries of the
United States of America, and of the Repuolic of New
Granada have signed and sealed these presents in the
city of BOGOta on the twelfth day of December, in the
year of Our Lord one thousand eir�ht hundred and forty
six.
B. A. Bidlack
M. M. Mallarino

Seal
Seal

Additional Article
The Republic of the United States and of New
Granada will hold and admit as national ships of one
or the other, all those that shall be provided by the
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respective Government with a Patent issued according
to its laws.
The present additional article shall have the
same force and validity as if it were inserted, word
for word, in the Treaty signed this day.

It shall be

ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at
the same time.
In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries
have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their
seals.

Done in the city of Bogota, the twelfth day

of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and forty six.
Seal

B. A. Bidlack
M. M. Mallarino6

Great Britain:

April 19, 1850

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Convention for
Facilitating and Protecting the Construction of
a Ship Canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, and for Other purposes, signed at
Washinston April 19, 1850. Original in English.
Submitted to the Senate April 22, 1850.
Resolution of advice and consent May 22, 1850.
Ratified by the Unit�d States May 23, 1850.
Ratified by Great Britain June 11, 1850. iiati
fications exchanged at Washington July 4, 1850.
Proclaimed July 5, 1850.
The declaration of the Plenipotentiary of
Great Britain, dated June 29, 1850, is printed
in the editorial notes, with the relevant corre
spondence.
6Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International
Acts of the United States �ashin3ton: Government
Printing Office, 1937),115-143.
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Convention between the United States of America
and Her Britannic Majesty
The United States of America and Her Britannic
Majesty, being desirous of consolidating the relations
of amity which so happily subsist between them, by
setting forth and fixing in a Convention their views
and intentions with reference to any means of commun
ication by Ship Canal, which may be constructed between
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by the way of the
River San Juan de Nicaragua and either or both of the
Lakes Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place on the
Pacific Ocean,--The President of the United States,
has conferred full powers on John M. Clayton, Secretary
of State of the United States; and Her Britannic
Majesty on the Right Honourable Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer,
a Member of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council,
Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the
Bath, and Envoy Extraordinary and hlinister Plenipotentiary
of Her Britannic Majesty to the United States, for the
aforesaid purpose; and the said Plenipotentiaries
having exchanged their full powers, which were found
to be in proper form, have agreed to the following
articles.
Article I
The Governments of the United States and Great
Britain hereby declare, that neither the one nor the
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other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any
exclusive control over the said Ship Canal; agreeinJ,
that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications
commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof, or
occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise
any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito
Coast, or any part of Central America; nor will either
make use of any protection which either affords or may
afford, or any alliance which either has or may have,
to or with any State or People for the purpose of
erecting or maintaining any such fortifications, or of
occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Central
America, or of assumin3 or exercisin3 uominion over
the same; nor will the United States or Great Britain
take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance,
connection of influence that either may possess with
any State or Government throu,:,;h whose territory the
said Canal may pass, for the purpose of acquiring or
holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or
subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in regard
to commerce or navigation through the said Canal, which
shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens
or subjects of the other.
Article II
Vessels of the United States or Great �ritain,
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traversing the said �anal, shall in case of war between
the contracting parties, be exempted from blockade,
detention or capture, by either of the belligerents;
and this provision shall extend to such a distance from
the two ends of the said Canal, as may hereafter be
found expedient to establish.
Article III
In order to secure the construction of the said
vanal, the contracting parties engage that, if any such
Canal shall be undertaken upon fair and equitable terms
by any parties havin� the authority of the local Govern
ment or Governments, through whose territory the same
may pass, then the persons employed in makinD the said
Canal and their property useu, or to be used, for that
object, shall be protected, from the commencement of
the said Canal to its completion, by the Governments
of the United States and Great �ritain, from unjust
detention, confiscation, seizure or any violence what
soever.
Article IV
The contracting parties will use whatever influence
they respectively exercise, with any State, States or
Governments possessing, or claiming to possess, any
jurisdiction or ri!5ht over the territory which the said
Canal shall traverse, or which shall be near the waters
applicable thereto; in order to induce such States, or

183
Governments, to facilitate the construction of the said
vanal by every means in their Power: and furthermore,
the United States and Great Britain agree to use their
good offices, wherever or however it may be most expedi
ent, in order to procure the establishment of two free
Ports,--one at each end of the said Canal.
Article V
The contractin� parties further engage that, when
the said Canal shall have been completed, they will
protect it from interruption, seizure or unjust con
fiscation, and that they will guarantee the neutrality
thereof, so that the said Ganal may forever be open and
free, and the capital invested therein, secure.

Never

theless, the Governments of the United States and
Great �ritain, in according their protection to the
construction of the said Canal, and guaranteeing its
neutrality and security when completed, always under
stand that, this protection and guarantee are granted
conditionally, and may be withdrawn by both Governments,
or either Government, if both �overnments, or either
Governcent, should deem that the persons, or company,
undertaking or canaging the same, adopt or establish
such regulations concerning the traffic thereupon, as
are contrary to the spirit and intention of this Con
vention,--either by making unfair discriminations in
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favor of the commerce of one of the contracting parties
over the commerce of the other, or by imposing oppressive
exactions or unreasonable tolls upon passengers, vessels,
goods, wares, merchandize or other articles.

Neither

party, however, shall withdraw the aforesaid protection
and guarantee, without first �iving six months notice
to the other.
Article VI
The contracting parties in this Convention engage
to invite every State with which both or either have
friendly intercourse, to enter i4to stipulations with
them similar to those which they have entered into with
each other; to the end, that all other States may share
in the honor and advanta�e of havins contributed to a
work of such general interest and importance as the
Canal herein contemplated.--And the contractin8 parties
likewise agree that, each shall enter into Treaty
stipulations with such of the Central American States,
as they may deem advisable, for the purpose of more
effectually carrying out the great desi�n of this
Convention, namely,--that of constructing and maintain
ing the said Canal as a ship-communication between the
two Oceans for the benefit of mankind, on equal terms
to all, and of protecting the same; and they, also,
agree that, the good offices of either shall be employed
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when requested by the other, in aiding and assisting
the negotiation of such Treaty stipulations; and, should
any differences arise as to right or property over the
territory throu0h which the said Canal shall pass-

between the States or Governments of Central America,-
and such differences should, in any way, impede or
obstruct the execution of the said Canal, the Govern
ments of the United States and Great Britain will use
their good offices to settle such differences in the
manner best suited to promote the interests of the
said Canal, and to strengthen the bonds of friendship
and alliance which exist between the contracting
parties.
Article VII
It bein� desirable that no time should be un
necessarily lost in commencin� and constructing the
said Canal, the Governments of the United States
and Great Britain determine to give their support and
encouragement to such persons, or company, as may first
offer to commence the same with the necessary capital,
the consent of the local authorities, and on such
principles as accord with the spirit and intention of
this Convention; and if any persons, or company, should
already have, with any State through which the proposed
Ship-Canal may pass, a contract for the construction
of such a Canal as that specified in this Convention,--
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to the stipulations of which contract neither of the
contracting parties in this Convention have any just
cause to object,--and the said persons, or company,
shall moreover, have made preparations and expended
time, money and trouble on the faith of such contract,
it is hereby agreed, that such persons, or company,
shall have a priority of claim over every other person,
persons, or company, to the _protection of the Govern
ments of the United States and Great Britain, and be
allowed a year, from the date of the exchange of the
ratifications of this Convention, for concluding their
arrangements, and presenting evidence of sufficient
capital subscribed to accomplish the contemplated under
taking; it being understood, that if, at the expiration
of the aforesaid period, such persons, or company, be
not able to commence &nd carry out the proposed enter
prize, then the Governments of the United States and
Great Britain shall be free to afford their protection
to any other persons, or company, that shall be pre
pared to commence and proceed with the construction of
the Canal in question.
Article VIII
The Govern..�ents of the United States and Great
Britain having not only desired in entering into this
Convention, to accomplish a particular object, but,

187
also, to establish a �eneral principle, they hereby
agree to extend their protection, by Treaty stipulations,
to any other practicable communications, whether by
Canal or rail-way, across the Isthmus which connects
North and South America; and, especially, to the
interoceanic communications,--should the same prove to
be practicable, whether by Canal or rail-way,--which
are now proposed to be established by the way of
Tehuantepec, or Panama.

In granting, however, their

joint protection to any such Canals, or rail-ways, as
are by this Article specified, it is always understood
by the United States and Great Britain, that the
parties constructing or owning the same, shall impose
no other charges or conditions of traffic thereupon,
than the aforesaid Governments shall approve of, as
just and equitable; and, that the same Canals, or rail
ways, being open to the citizens and subjects of the
United States and Great Britain on equal terms, shall,
also, be open on like terms to the citizens and subjects
of every other State which is willing to grant thereto,
such protection as the United States and Great Britain
engage to afford.
Article IX
The ratifications of this Convention shall be ex
changed at Washington, within six months from this day,
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or sooner, if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries,
have signed this Convention, and have hereunto affixed
our Seals.
Done, at Washington, the nineteenth day of April,
Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and fifty.
John r.1. Clayton
Henry Lytton Bulwer

7 10c. cit., 671-675

Seal
Seal 7
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